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Abstract
This thesis attempted to critically examine the concept of class as it has been
developed and deployed by European Marxism. The central question that guided
this investigation was: “what constitutes the being of a class?” In course of
developing an answer to this ontological question, this thesis approached the
problem of class from two different methodological perspectives. The first part of
this thesis attempted to understand class via a brief examination of the history of
the concept as it appears in the writing of Marxist theorists from the original
writings of Marx and Engels to the more-politically oriented theories of Vladimir
Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. The examination of the writing of Marx and Engels
revealed that the concept of class is ambiguous at the origins of Marxist theory.
The study of Luxemburg and Lenin attempted to demonstrate how early 20th
century Marxism tried to make sense of this ambiguity by fixing the essence of
classes to an autonomous and determinate sphere of economic reality.
The second part of this thesis approached the problem of the ontology of class
through social theory. It picked up where part 1 left off, with a critique of the
theory of economic determinism that was developed by 20th century Marxism.
After rejecting this understanding of social reality, part 2 attempted to develop an
alternative social theory from Marxist principles in order to find a new ontological
foundation for classes.
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1. Introduction

At the heart of Marxist theory is the idea that the character and development of
every society is determined by a class-struggle. To formulate this idea simply
would be to state that society splits into specific classes via the economic division
of labor and that these classes correspond to specific strata and hierarchical
positions. The ruling class of every epoch forces other classes to toil in order to
produce wealth that is then appropriated by that ruling class. In this way, every
society is structured around specific relations of class domination and
exploitation. These relations are not fixed or static; they are determined by a
struggle for power between classes as each ruling class attempts to maintain its
position while the exploited class seeks to overthrow the societal order that
oppresses it and establish a new one in its image. In this political theory, classes
are the agents of political and societal transformation; they are the privileged
subjects of history.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels formulated the basis for this theory of classstruggle in the mid-19th century, when capitalism had only just emerged as a
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dominant economic mode of production. Given their declaration, in The
Communist Manifesto, that capitalism “cannot exist without constantly
revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of
production, and with them the whole relations of society,” one ought to assume
that the social reality in which these thinkers produced their works differs greatly
from our own. 1 Given these historico-social transformations, I think that the
concept of class, which forms such a central part of Marxist theory, should be reexamined. Moreover the re-examination of the concept of class is almost made
into a necessity when one considers the ways in which the development of history
has departed from the predictions of Marx and Engels. These authors asserted that
the laws of the development of capitalism ensured the increasing polarization of
society into two classes–bourgeoisie (capitalists) and proletariat (workers)–and
that this self-movement of capitalism ensured the victory of the proletariat, which
would inevitably make up a majority of the population of capitalist society. This
prophesy clearly does not match the class schema today, given the development
of a large “middle-class” in industrial and post-industrial economies of the global
north.2
While the reassessment of the class divisions of capitalist societies today is
already an ongoing and vigorous project within sociology at present, the goal of
my thesis is to develop an ontological examination of the concept class within the
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Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, edit. Robert C. Tucker (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 476.
2
For relatively recent sociological analyses of class division of modern capitalism, see Erik Olen
Wright et. al., The Debate on Classes (London: Verso, 1989). The example of the middle class is
taken from pages 3-8 of Wright’s introductory essay titled “A General Framework for the Analysis
of Class Structure.”
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Marxist tradition. The question that drives the following analyses will be “what is
the ‘classness’ of class?”, or, “what defines a class qua class?” In other words, the
following analyses will examine the specificity of the being of classes. In order to
develop an answer to this question, the first part of this work will scrutinize the
concept of class as it is presented in the early history of Marxist theory. This
return to the origins of Marxist theory will reveal that the question of the concept
of classes is still fairly ambiguous at the outset, despite the fact that the political
project guided by this theory relies so heavily on the concept of the class-struggle.
So, in this thesis, I intend to investigate the nature of class and evaluate the utility
of this concept in the development of Marxist political theory.
I will approach the question of the classness of class through the following
steps. In part 1, I will argue that the question of the being of classes was never
properly formulated in the Marxist tradition. This argument will continue in
chapter 2, through a rereading of selected writings of Marx and Engels and will
develop the thesis that the term “class” designates a multiplicity of conceptual
beings; I will ultimately argue that the term has no singular referent. In chapter 3,
I will examine two prominent Marxist political theorists of the early 20th century–
Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir Lenin–and will examine how their political
proposals and ideas attempt to make sense of the ambiguous concept of class by
grounding it in an autonomous and determinate economic sphere of reality. The
goal of these chapters is not only to lend some ontological specificity to the
concept of class within the Marxist tradition, but also to acquaint the reader with
some of the general developments and theoretical legacies of the way in which the

3

being of class was elucidated (or mystified) by Marxism. Additionally, this
analysis will demonstrate the diversity of thought within early Marxism.
After this brief historical exploration of the concept of class, chapter 4 will
examine the ontological ground in which the concept of class was rooted by early
Marxism through a critique of the theory of social reality that is divided into an
economic base and a societal superstructure. Chapter 4 is also intended to serve
the reader as an explanation of some key features of Marx’s critique of capitalism
in order to locate the concept of within this larger critical theoretical framework.
These key concepts are the value-form of the commodity, the theory of
exploitation, and the concept of commodity fetishism. By examining these
concepts through a rereading of the first volume of Marx’s Capital, chapter 4 will
develop a critique of economic determinism. This critique will assert that the
economic theory of exploitation developed in Capital is logically incompatible
with economic determinism. By focusing on the arguments of Marx’s magnum
opus, this critique of the base/superstructure model seeks to attack this idea at its
theoretical origins rather than by listing historical counterexamples, as Marxist
theorists have been too quick to dismiss these empirical critiques on the grounds
that they represent a perversion of theory. This argument attempts to confront the
logic of economic determinism on the same discursive plane.
After discarding the base/superstructure as a model of understanding social
reality, chapter 5 will attempt to develop a new social theory from key ideas of the
Marxist tradition. This will be done in order to secure a new ontological
foundation for classes. This chapter will begin by analyzing the various networks
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of meaning in the German words that Marx and Engels use for “society,” “social,”
and “societal.” After working out a new Marxist terminology for social reality,
this analysis will look to the work of Étienne Balibar to understand class identity
beyond exclusively economic relations. This chapter will then look at the theory
of the multitude as it is presented by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in Empire.
This will culminate in the illustration of a new Marxist social theory from which I
will attempt to make sense of classes.
Despite my intentions at the outset of this project, this work will not culminate
in a complete ontological account of classes. It is intended to lay the groundwork
for further philosophical investigation of the concept of class and seeks to push
the horizons of possibility for Marxist thought by uprooting some dogmatically
held positions. In returning to the writings of Marx and Engels, this work does not
mean to treat these texts as sacred documents, but rather to reveal that the
traditional meanings that have been derived from them do not have an exclusive
claim to authenticity.
Having said this, at no point will this work assert that classes are fictional
beings or that they should be discarded by political theory. Economic
stratification and related hierarchies of power are real. There are owners of capital
and owners of labor-power and the former certainly exploits the latter. What the
following analyses seek to demonstrate, however, is that the borders of classes are
not as clearly defined as that simple formulation would seem to imply. This
complication of the class-composition of capitalist society is meant to be a
cautionary tale. If classes are not as readily definable as has been thought, then it
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becomes difficult to assert that a given political movement or body has an
exclusive claim to being the representative of a given class. This claim to
representation of the proletariat has been laid by a number of vile and brutal
dictators who justified their atrocities by claiming that they functioned as a means
to liberation. This thesis does not seek to deny the existence of classes; it
questions the validity of representative power that has been built on some
problematic understandings of class ontology in Marxism.

6

Part 1: Class
through History
The Concept from Marx and Engels through Luxemburg and
Lenin

7

2. Ambiguity at the Origins
Multiple Classes in Marx and Engels

Political theories in the Marxist tradition accept the validity and necessity of
the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the capitalists. These two
historical entities are conceived of as inherently antagonistic classes. Yet, all too
often, these movements and systems of thought in the Marxist tradition fail to
examine, first and foremost, what the political ontology of a “class” is. The
primary result of this disagreement over, or lack of investigation into, this
fundamental problem of the political being of the proletariat in various strains of
Marxist thought has ensured that words like “class,” “proletariat,” and
“bourgeoisie” have multiple definitions. These different conceptions of the
“class” in various Marxist theories have produced radically different
revolutionary political movements over the course of the past century and a half–
from the early social democratic movement in Germany, and its political
descendants in Western Europe, to the Bolshevik Revolution and the development
of the Soviet state throughout the 20th century. This first half of the thesis has two
central goals. First, it will acquaint the reader with some of the various
understandings of class in the Marxist tradition. Second, it will locate a common
thread linking these heterogeneous notions of class; in doing so I hope to discover
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a conceptual plane of consistency that could provide the groundwork for the
development of an ontology of class–an effort that could, in turn, facilitate the
development of class-consciousness.
Before diving into this historical investigation, some methodological concerns
ought to be addressed. First, this explication of the multiplicity of concepts under
the one label of “class” is rooted in a narrow and limited history of ideas. Its
sources will be works of Marxist theory, and this chapter will be focused on the
writings of Marx and Engels specifically. In chapter two, I will turn to writings of
theorists working in the early 20th century. I will not claim that these texts
represent the totality of Marxist thought concerning the political ontology of class.
The few sources upon which this investigation relies have been selected in order
to give a balanced understanding of the heterogeneity of concepts of class in the
Western Marxist tradition. Questions about the social, economic, and political
forces that play a determining role in the development of the various concepts of
class–in short, questions linking the conceptual interiority to a material and/or
social exteriority, while important, are not of chief concern here. This
investigation will seldom stray from the intellectual terrain of theory.
Second, this project is not explicitly or directly genealogical. While a
genealogy of the concept of class would be fascinating and invaluable, the goal
here is not to understand how or why the concept of class underwent a series of
transformations in the past century and a half. Again, I am only aiming to
understand in what ways one concept of class differs from another within the
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Marxist tradition, and to attempt to find some way in which the various concepts
participate in some commonality.
Third, the thesis of this analysis is that the single word “class” has denoted a
multiplicity of conceptual beings throughout the history of the Marxist tradition.
This work is non-genealogical in order to avoid linking the one word to one line
of historical development from which one could simply interpret “class” as a
singular but changing unity. By this I mean that there really are multiple concepts
of class at play within Marxism and that “class” is not simply one concept that is
being altered throughout the history of Marxism. We have not abandoned one
concept of class for another, but these various ideas about the political ontology of
class exist simultaneously in Marxist thought today–though each idea is linked to
at least one historical period in which it occupied a privileged place in Marxist
political theory produced in Europe. Though the next few pages will
chronologically map the theoretical points in the history of the ideas of class,
tracing or drawing possible lines of flight or development from one point to
another is too bold a task to accomplish in this text.
I. Economic Duality of Master and Slave
A brief examination of some passages from the collaborative writing of Marx
and Engels reveals that “class” is already a fairly ambiguous concept. In their first
collaborative work, The Holy Family: A Critique of Critical Criticism, Marx and
Engels briefly analyze the essence of class-struggle in capitalism in a section
titled “Alienation and Social Classes.” In this work, attention is given to only two
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classes in capitalist society–the bourgeoisie (capital) and the proletariat (labor).3
“The proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such they form a whole. They are
both products of the world of private property. The whole question is what
position each of these two elements occupies within the opposition.”4 These two
classes, and the antagonism revolving around the relation to the mode of
production between them, represent the totality of social reality in capitalism.
That is to say that, in capitalism, society is divided into a binary made up of the
owners of the means of production, which form the bourgeoisie, and that the
laborers who produce commodities form the proletariat, which form the
proletariat. Social reality in the age of capitalism is essentially determined by an
antagonistic relationship between these two classes:
[The bourgeoisie] is compelled to preserve its own existence and
thereby the existence of the proletariat. This is the positive side of
the antagonism… The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled
to abolish itself and thereby its conditioning opposite–private
property–which makes it a proletariat. This is the negative side of
the antagonism… The possessing class and the proletarian class
represent one and the same human self-alienation.5
Classes emerge from the specific relations of ownership of the means of
production. There is, then, an already given structural element to classes in
capitalism. The owners of the means of production are capitalists, and those who
do not own the means of production, but who must still utilize them in order to
obtain the means of subsistence, are proletarians. But Marx is arguing that the
3

The nouns “society” and “the social” are not synonymous in this work. The effort to distinguish
these two symbols has been inspired by Michael Halewood, whose book, Rethinking the Social
through Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and Whitehead, will play an important role in a later chapter of
this project. So as not to leave the reader in the dark, suffice it to say here that, in the most basic
sense, “society” refers to a specific structural organization on the plane of “the social.” The social
is a broader metaphysical concept than society.
4
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 133.
5
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 133.
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antagonism is societal and not individual: the issue is the system of economic
relations that produces the specific class divisions that shape individuals.
The societal dimension of this schema is attested to by the fact that an
historical movement is already given for this system of relations: the bourgeoisie
will attempt to maintain the system of private property, while the proletariat will
attempt to abolish this system. This historical struggle is not endless because the
nature of the antagonism necessarily gives the proletariat the upper hand: “In its
economic movement, it is true, private property presses towards its own
dissolution, but it does this only by means of a developmental course that is
unconscious and takes place independently of it and against its will, a course
determined by the nature of the thing itself.”6 The economy not only determines
the structure of the class-antagonism in society but also determines the
development of that antagonism in a way that is supposedly beyond the will of the
ruling class. As capitalism develops, it further develops the “proletariat as
proletariat–this poverty conscious of its own spiritual and physical poverty, this
dehumanization which is conscious of itself as a dehumanization and hence
abolishes itself.”7 This economic and historical determinism would later be
echoed in the first volume of Capital when Marx proclaims that “it is only in so
far as the appropriation of ever more and more wealth in the abstract becomes the
sole motive of his operations, that he functions as a capitalist, that is, as capital
personified and endowed with consciousness and a will.”8 The bourgeoisie is
therefore defined as the instrument of the expansion of capital while the
6

Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 134.
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 134.
8
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 334.
7
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proletariat is defined as the human poverty produced by this expansion of wealth
and that seeks to abolish the world of private property, the system of economic
relations that produces both classes.
Perhaps the most fascinating implication of this brief explanation of capitalism
as class-antagonism is the issue of consciousness. The bourgeoisie is the
unconscious structural agent of capitalism; it is therefore alienated from human
agency and consciousness. The proletariat, on the other hand, is developed as selfconscious poverty in its alienation from the production of wealth. Yet the
proletariat is still only an agent in so far as it recognizes its already determined
role in material history: “It is not a matter of what this or that proletarian or even
the proletariat as a whole pictures at present as its goal. It is a matter of what the
proletariat is in actuality and what, in accordance with this being, it will
historically be compelled to do.”9 Thus, from this early work, we can see that:
there are two classes in capitalist society (the bourgeoisie and the proletariat);
these classes are determined by the structure of the economic system; the goals of
each class are determined by historical and economic necessity (the bourgeoisie to
expand capital and the proletariat to abolish private property); and, finally, the
unconsciousness of the bourgeoisie and the self-consciousness of the proletariat
ensure the victory of the proletariat as a necessary outcome of the development of
capital.
II. The Dual Proletariat–Economic and Political Being(s)
A new dimension is added to this notion of class-antagonism or class-struggle
at the tail end of Marx’s book The Poverty of Philosophy. In this early text, Marx
9

Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 134-135.

13

declares that “the antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a
struggle of class against class, a struggle which carried to its highest expression is
a total revolution… Do not say that social movement excludes political
movement. There is never a political movement which is not at the same time
social.”10 The social/political division that Marx is attacking here is the Hegelian
political notion that society is divided into the public realm of the state and the
private realm of civil society, which includes the economic sphere. According to
Hegel, it is the state that determines the structure of civil society and therefore
political movements are only secondarily social. In other words, social
movements are not political, but have been determined by the political
apparatus.11 Marx and Engels, however, have rooted the logic of historical
development and of the structure of the society in the economic sphere. The classstruggle is thus an economic struggle first and foremost, but it is necessarily also a
political struggle:
Economic conditions first transformed the mass of the people of
the country into workers. The combination of capital has created
for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is
thus already a class against capital, but not yet for itself. In the
struggle… this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a
class for itself. But the struggle of class against class is a political
struggle.12
This restatement of the nature of class struggle adds a new level of complexity to
the issue of class composition. At the economic level, there are already two
opposed classes produced by capitalism. But the struggle between these classes is

10

Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 219.
See, for example, Marx’s Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Marx,
The Marx-Engels Reader, 16-18.
12
Marx, The Marx-Engels Reader, 219.
11
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supposed to take place at the political level. This means that in order for the
proletariat to become a class against capital for itself, actually existing individuals
must become conscious of their class position in the political sphere of society.
Self-consciousness is no longer guaranteed to the proletariat; it must arrive at selfconsciousness not simply through the reality of economic oppression, but through
a contested political struggle against that oppression. In some sense, Marx is
positing two separate classes or at least two beings of class: the economic class
that is given and already constituted by the economic system, and the political
class that is defined by the developments of the class-struggle. In place of the
certainty of the proletarian revolution, “the last word of social science will always
be: ‘Combat or death: bloody struggle or extinction. It is thus that the question is
inexorably put.”13 This indeterminacy of the class struggle and the importance of
the constitution of the proletariat as a political being are themes that are further
developed in the Communist Manifesto.
III. The Problem of Class Consciousness
There is a realization of the impact history has had on the character of classes
in the Manifesto that adds to this indeterminacy of the class-struggle. The opening
line of this text’s first section, “Bourgeois and Proletarians,” is the famous dictum
that “[t]he history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class
struggles.”14 This definition of the class-struggle as history demands that Marx
and Engels examine the implications of the history of class-struggle. It now needs
to be explained how classes in the 19th-century Europe are produced and defined

13
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Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 218.
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 473.
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by previous epochs. They begin by stating that the class-divisions of previous
epochs were characterized by “a manifold gradation of social rank… the epoch of
the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified the
class antagonisms… into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie
and Proletariat.”15 The result of this simplification is not the immediate extinction
of all other classes and class-interests; we do not jump from one self-contained
society to another similarly closed system. The movement from one epoch to
another is characterized by a societal rupture that opens a system to its exterior–
namely, the irruption of new productive forces that cannot be integrated into a
structural order without that order and its elements changing in nature.
The Manifesto departs from the conception of class encountered in the earlier
analysis of The Holy Family in that the bourgeoisie is no longer the alreadyconstituted and static half of the societal-antagonism that defines the capitalist
epoch. In the Manifesto, the bourgeoisie is given a genesis story that ontologically
connects it with previous societies and class-relations:
We see then: the means of production and of exchange, on whose
foundation the bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal
society. At a certain stage in the development of these means of
production and of exchange, the conditions under which feudal
society produced and exchanged, the feudal organisation of
agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one word, the feudal
relations of property became no longer compatible with the already
developed productive forces; they became so many fetters. They
had to be burst asunder; they were burst asunder.16
We see, then, that the bourgeoisie partially developed and was developed by a
rupture in feudal society. Marx and Engels identify the material origin of this

15
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Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 474.
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 477-478.

16

rupture in the dual discovery of the Americas and a viable trade route to the East
(via circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope). The European world was
opened to a new exterior that expanded its markets and demanded more powerful
productive relations than those that could be controlled by feudal classstructures.17 It is at this point of societal rupture that the bourgeoisie emerged as a
revolutionary productive force that ultimately determined the transition from one
epoch to another.18
The account of the historical development of the proletariat in the Manifesto
reveals that the rupture that makes the transition from one epoch to another
possible is not completely abolished in the establishment of a societal system of
productive relations. In other words, every society maintains a definitive relation
to its past and previous form of societal organization. Just as the bourgeoisie is
drawn from other classes in feudal society, “the proletariat is recruited from all
classes of the population,” and the interests of those older classes are not
immediately extinguished by the triumph of bourgeois society.19
For instance, at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, when the factory began
to occupy a place of central importance in the mode of production, the individuals
comprising the infantile proletariat directed their “attacks not against the
bourgeois conditions of production, but against the instruments of production
themselves,” and all of these efforts sought “to restore by force the vanished
status of the workman of the Middle Ages.”20 Marx and Engels build on the split-

17

Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 474.
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 474.
19
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 480.
20
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 480.
18
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being of classes (discovered in the Poverty of Philosophy) to assert that, though
the bourgeois relations of production actually constitute a fully formed proletariat
as an economic entity with the onset of the industrial revolution, this class does
not recognize itself at the political level and instead continues to identify with
vestigial class-interests. The political or societal unity of individual proletarians,
which constitute the proletariat as a class located at the level of economic reality,
is “broken up by their mutual competition,” which is driven by an identification
with vestigial class-interests at the political level of reality. “At this stage,
therefore, the proletarians do not fight their enemies, but the enemies of their
enemies, the remnants of absolute monarchy, the landowners, the non-industrial
bourgeois, the petty bourgeoisie.”21 The actions of the proletariat are not initially
guided by its own economic class-interests, but by the interests of the classes from
which the original proletarians were drawn–e.g., artisans, serfs, vassals, etc. “This
organisation of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political
party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers
themselves.”22 Thus, the ongoing political task of the proletariat is defined by the
struggle to differentiate its own class interests from those of the classes from
which it developed. The economic determinism of The Holy Family is replaced by
the contingent project of political realization of class-interests in The Communist
Manifesto.
IV. Multiplication of Classes

21
22

Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 480.
Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 481.
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This struggle of the proletariat to constitute itself as a self-conscious political
entity is further complicated in the Manifesto by the existence of peripheral
classes aside from the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This recognition of multiple
classes beyond the two that dominate the bourgeois societal-antagonism is a
necessary result of the historicization of class-composition, since the transition
from feudalism to capitalism did not immediately abolish every societal relation
that was rooted in the feudal epoch. Marx and Engels principally highlight two
classes: the “lower middle class” and the “dangerous class.” The former is made
up of “the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, [etc., and] all of these fight against
the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle
class.”23 What is most interesting in the definition of this class is that it is made up
of a diverse array of economic agents; the artisan and the peasant are not involved
in the same economic relations. The articulation of a common class-identity that
links these individuals cannot be immediately explained with reference to some
unity within the mode of production. The “classness” of the petty-bourgeoisie is,
therefore, developed from the consistency of their reactionary political interests.
This definition breaks with all previous accounts of the ontology of class in that it
posits that the petty-bourgeoisie must first be politically united and can only
secondarily constitute an economic class. These vestigial class-identities of an
earlier society cannot constitute their identity around their productive relations in
capitalist society because these productive relations no longer occupy a position
of central importance in the bourgeois mode of production. The only economic
commonality linking the members of this class, then, is their anachronism as a
23

Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 482.
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productive force. Lacking a coherent economic basis for their identity, this class
instead unifies its members through the articulation of a shared reactionary
political program. In this way, the petty-bourgeoisie is a constructed class identity
that is rooted solely in the political level of reality. The petty-bourgeoisie seeks to
trace a political line of flight that can reverse the ruptural transition from
feudalism to capitalism. The proletariat must not only distinguish its own interests
from those of its ancestors, but also from the interests of this reactionary anticapitalist class that persists alongside the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. This
means that the proletarian struggle for self-consciousness is not only disrupted by
its own past, but also by the interests of this marginal class existing in the present.
The dangerous class similarly threatens the proletarian political project. This
“passively rotting mass thrown off by the lowest layers of old society, may, here
and there, be swept into the movement by a proletarian revolution; its conditions
of life, however, prepare it far more for the part of a bribed tool of reactionary
intrigue.”24 The dangerous class, or lumpenproletariat, is made up of the
individuals who are intentionally kept from participating in the relations of
production. The army of the unemployed is used by the bourgeoisie to threaten
the members of the proletariat with economic insecurity. The example of extreme
destitution and accompanying economic desperation that characterizes the
condition of the lumpenproletarait justifies the idea that the proletariat’s
opportunity to engage in wage-labor in order to secure the means of subsistence is
its good fortune–a gift from the bourgeoisie. This gift of employment cannot be
afforded to everyone and so only compliant and productive workers will continue
24
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to be allowed to work for a capitalist.25 Unlike the lower middle class, the
dangerous class is a direct product of the new mode of production. It is an
underclass so heavily and hopelessly exploited that in the eyes of Marx and
Engels it is only fit to be a reactionary tool of the bourgeoisie.
The proletariat must, therefore, be careful not to identify too strongly with this
desperate class in its political activity, since this extreme poverty could potentially
exacerbate above mentioned “competition between workers themselves.” The
problem of the identity of the dangerous class is the opposite of the problem of
the identity of the lower middle class: whereas the lower middle class has no
unified economic interest but only a unified political being, the dangerous class is
unified in its exclusion from relations of production and exchange but cannot be
politically unified due to its extreme deprivation.
In the end, the proletariat needs to recognize its unified economic interests
beyond a simple anti-capitalist political program. This means that it will have to
become politically self-conscious of itself as an economic being distinct from
both the reactionary mass of the lower middle class and the precariously deprived
dangerous class. In laying out this political project, the Manifesto presents a new
schematization of classes. The proletariat and bourgeoisie are the two dominant,
but not the only, classes in capitalist society. Proletarian and bourgeois identities
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are rooted in material economic relations, but their identities must be realized at
the political level of reality; the proletariat is not automatically self-conscious.
The realization of political self-consciousness for the proletariat is not guaranteed
given the impossibility of self-consciousness of the dangerous class. It may also
not entirely be rooted in material economic relations, given that the unity of the
lower middle class is secured at the political and not the economic level of reality.
The Communist Manifesto complicates the ontology of classes not only by
introducing a whole series of class-identities that escape the traditional proletariatcapitalist dichotomy, but also by providing a sophisticated framework for the
problem of class-consciousness of the proletariat itself. Each class, then, exists in
social reality through multiple beings: there are either both an economic and a
political incarnation of each, or there is at least a contested struggle to constitute a
unified being-class in each of these spheres. This ontological division of classes
leads Marx and Engels to apply the term “working-class” to the economic unity
and the term “communist” to the effort at constituting a political unity for the
proletariat.
Moreover, given the emergence of this crisis of class-consciousness, The
Communist Manifesto seems to give some pride of place to “Communists” as the
political agents–over the “working-class” with regard to the actualization of the
revolutionary potential of the proletariat:26
Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every
country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other
hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat
26
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the advantage of clearly understanding… the ultimate general
results of the proletarian movement.27
Communists are here defined as the class conscious segment of the working-class
that will push forward the revolution. And yet, “Communists do not form a
separate party opposed to other working class-parties. They have no interests
separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole.”28 In these passages,
the problem of class-consciousness is simply glossed over or discarded outright.
Communists are defined as the political agents of the revolution who have
overcome the divide that separates the political and economic beings of the
proletariat without explaining how such an epistemological disconnect can be
overcome.
The political interests of the Communists would, therefore, not be opposed to
working-class political parties because Communists understand the historical
destiny of the proletariat. The problem that this formulation hides is the fact that
working-class parties may be opposed to the strategy and tactics of Communists
and this possibility (and reality) could only be made consistent with the
formulation above if it is argued that these working-class parties would then be
working against the interests of the proletariat. What this theory needs to explain,
then, is the classness of class that is understood by Communists and which
escapes other political beings that claim to represent the interests of the workingclass.
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V. Theoretical Dissolution
Marx most clearly tries to tackle the problem of the classness of class in the
posthumously published third volume of Capital. In the section of this work titled
“Classes,” he briefly defines classes according to their relations of property
ownership: “The owners merely of labour-power, owners of capital, and
landowners, whose respective sources of income are wages, profit and groundrent, in other words, wage-labourers, capitalists, and landowners, constitute then
three big classes of modern society based upon the capitalist mode of
production.”29 In this initial formulation, class identities are clearly defined by
their economic activity, specifically the property relations that define capitalism.
Other classes, aside from those listed–such as the lumpenproletarait and the pettybourgeoisie–are not denied class-status; they are considered marginal classes and
they do not define the class composition of capitalism. Additionally, the simplistic
articulation of the class-composition of capitalist society is no longer a dichotomy
(bourgeoisie-proletariat), but is now framed as a triad. That is, landowners are
now considered a distinct class that belongs to the epoch of capitalism (though, as
we saw above, they are treated as a part of the petty-bourgeoisie in The
Communist Manifesto).30
This altered and complicated schematization of classes in capitalist society
quickly falls apart: “In England, modern society is indisputably most highly and
classically developed in economic structure. Nevertheless, even here the
stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate
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strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere… however this is
immaterial for our analysis.”31 Marx essentially observes that his schema is
empirically wrong, and then argues that it should be maintained simply because it
theoretically makes sense. This is an inexplicably contradictory moment in which
the historical materialist argues that lessons of material history be sacrificed for
the sake of his ideas.32 This disconnect between theory and history then forces
Marx to ask: “What constitutes a [pure] class?” To which he responds:
At a first glance–the identity of revenues and the sources of
revenues… However, from this standpoint, physicians and
officials, e.g., would also constitute two classes, for they belong to
two distinct social groups, the members of each of these groups
receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same
would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank
into which the division of social labour splits the labourers as well
as capitalists and landlords–the latter, e.g., into owners of
vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners, and
owners of fisheries.33
The expansion of the division of labor into every field of economic activity–even
the factory, where it is later intensified under Taylorism and Fordism and welders
are differentiated from riveters–multiplies the distinct economic identities of
workers, capitalists, and landowners to such an extent that one cannot find classes
defined by a homogenous unity of interests for all members. In volume three of
Capital, the idea of class unity becomes an inescapable crisis at the level of
empirically observable economic activity. Moreover, Marx presents the reader
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with no way out of the problem since the manuscript breaks off at the very end of
the passage I just cited.

VI. Conceptual Multiplicity
The preceding analysis has attempted to demonstrate that the idea of class is
never settled by Marx and Engels. From the early formulation of class-antagonism
that defines capitalism in The Poverty of Philosophy to the attempt to understand
the classness of class in volume three of Capital, there is no definitive ontological
account of classes or the class composition of society. In the beginning of this
analysis, we saw a confident if simplistic schematization of classes in capitalist
society–a dialectical struggle for domination between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat–while at the end of this analysis, it appears that the entire idea of classidentity was nearly beyond the realm of possibility. However, the reader should
not conclude from this rhetorical trajectory that the concept of class must be
abandoned by Marxism; although the exploration of texts in this work was
broadly chronological, it is in no way teleological. All of the various concepts of
class that have been revealed to hide under the same name in the writings of Marx
and Engels have continued to live on in the history of political philosophy and
sociology after Marx and Engels.34 As we shall see in the next chapter, these
conceptual beings are given some coherence by being tied to an economic plane
of consistency by Marxist philosophers of the early 20th century.
34
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3. The Early 20th Century and the
Economic Plane of Consistency
Economic Determinism in Luxemburg and Lenin
The ambiguity of the concept of class as it is developed in the writing of Marx
and Engels haunts Marxist political theory through the 20th century. In this
chapter, I will demonstrate how the multiple conceptual beings that are referred to
by Marx and Engels with the word “class” were woven together by early 20th
century theorists with a thread of consistency that attempts to make sense of the
concept by grounding it in a theory of economic determinism. Marxist theory in
the early 20th century will declare that although “classes” may have multiple
beings (political, economic, cultural, etc.), their primordial forms are determined
at the level of the mode of production. The central problem facing the
anticapitalist struggle, then, is to bring this economic reality to the level of
consciousness.
This chapter will pick up where the last left off by examining how the concept
of class is made consistent in the writings of Rosa Luxemburg and Vladimir
Lenin. I am focusing this analysis on works written by two thinkers who critique
the passivity of the international Social Democratic parties that were heirs to the
political project of Marx and Engels after both died. Because both of the works
examined below emerge from a remarkably similar political and theoretical
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climate in the history of Marxism, the fact that they present two vastly different
understandings of the nature of class-struggle and revolution demonstrates the
diversity of thought emerging from early 20th century Marxist thought. This
diversity of conclusions, however, belies the pervasive influence of economic
determinism that is at work in the works of both thinkers and the Social
Democrats to whom they were responding.
Staying in line with the preceding analysis, this will not be a genealogical
investigation. There is no unified ontological account of classes in the Marxist
tradition, and it would be wrong to say that each variation represents a new step
on the historical development of the concept of class. The same is to be said with
this economic materialist grounding of the concept. The play of similarities and
differences between the ideas and approaches of Luxemburg and Lenin are not
teleological developments but a series of responses that do not supplant one
another.
I. Luxemburg and Praxis
Rosa Luxemburg wrote The Mass Strike, the Political Party, and the Trade
Unions as a critique of the German Social Democratic Party’s treatment of the
tactic of the mass strike as anathema. She argues that the problem with the Social
Democrats’ conception of the mass strike is that it attempts to differentiate
economic strikes from political strikes and presupposes that such movements are
only useful for the proletariat if they can be controlled or directed by the party.
Luxemburg argues that Social Democrats are right to say that the mass strike
cannot be directed or propagated by a representative party, but this should not
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matter because it is only through the self-movement of the mass strike that the
proletariat can hope to achieve unity and self-consciousness.35
By making the mass strike a model of self-conscious revolutionary activity,
Rosa Luxemburg attempts to overcome the problem of class-consciousness
present in the work of Marx and Engels by filtering epistemology through praxis.
In 1906, the mass strike was a hotly contested tactic of the proletarian struggle. It
had been the dominant form of resistance and upheaval during the first Russian
revolution against the Tsarist state and had thus seemed to prove itself to be an
effective means of advancing proletarian interests. The problem for German
Social Democrats, however, was the question of how the mass strike could be
planned and implemented in a directly political manner. Luxemburg disagreed
with the terms of this debate on the efficacy of the mass strike, arguing that “the
mass strike is not artificially ‘made,’ not ‘decided’ at random, not ‘propagated,’
but that it is an historical phenomenon which, at a given moment, results from
social conditions with historical inevitability.”36 She argues that there is no
guiding political being that could determine, through contemplation, the direction
of the mass strike beforehand and then direct its every development; the mass
strike is a response to the determined trajectory of history.
What Luxemburg opposes in the Social Democrats’ debate about the efficacy
of the mass strike is the presupposition that the intellectual labor aristocracy is
responsible for the development of class-consciousness for the rest of the
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proletariat. She argues that this debate is characterized by a fundamental
misrecognition of the active process of the development of class-consciousness.
In order to be able to overthrow it [absolutism] the proletariat
require a high degree of political education, of class consciousness
and organization. All these conditions cannot be fulfilled by
pamphlets and leaflets, but only by the living political school, by
the fight and in the fight, in the continuous course of the
revolution.37
Furthermore, she asserts in a preceding passage that “‘[r]evolution’ like ‘mass
strike’ signifies nothing but an external form of the class struggle which can have
sense and meaning only in connection with definite political situations.”38
Revolution is therefore only the political realization of the antagonism immanent
in the class-struggle, which brings about a crisis. It, like the mass strike, is already
made necessary by a determined historical trajectory. The process of the
realization of this trajectory, the realization of revolution, is not achieved by
removing a portion of the working-class from the experience of class-struggle in
order to contemplate it, but by intensifying the antagonism of the class-struggle
through political action.
Her argument modifies The Communist Manifesto’s assertion that Communists
as the class-conscious portion of the working-class will advance the interests of
the proletariat by denying that their “advantage of clearly understanding… the
ultimate general results of the proletarian movement” gives them any ability to
command the revolution or develop class-consciousness outside of the activity of
the revolution. In her view, Communists can initiate, but cannot direct,
antagonistic confrontations through which the class-consciousness of the
37
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proletariat will be developed.39 In this way, Luxemburg posits a solution to the
absolute disintegration of all classes through the ever expanding division of labor
by attacking the division between the workers and the labor aristocracy that is
supposed to represent them. This is the first step toward the unification of the
proletariat.
Thus far, however, we have not discovered the being of the proletariat as it is
discussed in Luxemburg’s work. What this analysis seeks to understand is the
classness of class that defines the proletariat and that must be raised to the level of
consciousness in political activity. We at least find an expression of the
ontological foundation of classes through Luxemburg’s understanding of the mass
strike as both a political and an economic struggle. “In a word, the economic
struggle is the transmitter from one political center to another; the political
struggle is the periodic fertilization of the soil for the economic struggle… [they
are] two interlacing sides of the proletarian class struggle in Russia. And, their
unity is precisely the mass strike.”40 Luxemburg defines the mass strike as the
performative link bridging the discontinuous planes of economic and political
reality. The dual being of the proletariat that we saw emerge in the works of Marx
and Engels resurfaces again in Luxemburg who provides an answer to the
problem of class-consciousness. Though the two beings are united in the
movement of the mass strike, it is important to note that ontological primacy is
given to the economic activity in determining the being of the proletariat. The
economic struggle taking place at the relations of production is the soil of the
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proletarian struggle as a whole. There is certainly a dialectical character to the
interplay between the economic and political struggles in which the latter rises up
from the former in order to fertilize it, but the only permanent plane of being for
the proletariat is economic. So Luxemburg ultimately argues that the political
struggle of the proletariat is only a conscious expression of the antagonistic
character of the economic relations of production. This means that the historical
determinism that we encountered earlier is really the temporal expression of
economic determinism; political activity and reality is only an outgrowth of the
internal logic of the economic sphere.
II. Lenin and Representation
A. The Vanguard Party
The ontological primacy that Luxemburg gives the economic relations of
production in determining the being of classes is brought to its most historicallystriking conclusion in Lenin’s formulation of the necessity of the vanguard party.
In What is to be Done?, a pamphlet published in 1902, Lenin attempts to settle a
debate within the Russian Social Democracy Party as to whether the proletariat
will attain class-consciousness through economic struggle and the development of
the mode of production or whether a political struggle is necessary to
revolutionize the proletariat. Lenin argues for the latter, asserting that “the task of
Social-Democracy, is to combat spontaneity [of the development of
consciousness], to divert the working-class movement from this spontaneous,
trade-unionist striving to come under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it
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under the wing of revolutionary Social Democracy.”41 Lenin argues that the
history of the development of working-class movements across Europe
demonstrates that it progresses toward a phase of trade-unionism that is managed
by the bourgeois state as a non-political struggle relegated to the antagonistic
confrontation of workers and owners of capital. Quoting Karl Kautsky, Lenin
argues that the restriction of the development of proletarian class-consciousness to
the antagonistic confrontation between workers and owners of capital ignores the
fact that “socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian
class struggle from without… and not something that arose within it
spontaneously [urwüchsig].”42 Lenin is here agreeing with Kautsky’s observation
that socialist theory was produced by individuals who were members of the
bourgeoisie–for instance, Karl Marx’s father was a relatively wealthy lawyer, who
provided him with a liberal bourgeois education, and Friedrich Engels’ father was
a capitalist, who owned textile factories that Engels’ would later run. Lenin
asserts that it was because theorists like Marx and Engels were not immersed fully
in the economic class-struggle that they could observe the laws of economic
development and class-antagonism that would lead and determine the classstruggle.43
This distinction between socialist ideology or consciousness and the material
working-class struggle reintroduces the dichotomy of economic and political
reality that framed the whole problem of class-consciousness in the writings of
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Marx and Engels, and of Luxemburg. Lenin would agree with Luxemburg’s
argument that the unity of the proletariat cannot be secured through economic
activity alone, but would contend that this class-struggle must be given an
explicitly political being. The language of this last sentence echoes the ontological
primacy given to the economy in determining reality–namely, the need to develop
the political being of the class struggle is built from the actually existing
economic struggle between already-constituted classes.
Lenin proposes an incredibly different solution to the problem of classconsciousness and unity than Luxemburg did. Where Luxemburg posits the mass
strike as a praxis that would spontaneously secure the unity of the proletariat by
politicizing the economic struggle, Lenin proposes the formation of a vanguard
party that will educate the proletariat on the principles of the class-struggle and
also forge class alliances that are explicitly political in that they project the class
interests of the proletariat beyond the economic-struggle and into the entire classdivision of society.44 While Luxemburg’s formulation of the unifying praxis of
the mass strike assures spontaneous class-alliances by which the petty-bourgeoisie
and lumpenproletariat are swept up into the radical action of the proletariat
proper, Lenin reverses the order of radicalization by arguing that Social
Democrats “must ‘go among all classes of the population’ as theoreticians, as
propagandists, as agitators, and as organisers.”45 In short, Lenin is arguing for the
formation of a representative political body above the proletariat that fully
understands proletarian class interests and spreads them throughout the social
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strata to “proletarianize” the masses before praxis is initiated. Along these lines he
writes: “In our time only a party that will organise really nation-wide exposures
can become the vanguard of the revolutionary forces.”46
This formulation of the vanguard party is opposed to Luxemburg’s
understanding of the complexity of historical reality that cannot be fully grasped
by any representative body of the proletariat. In The Mass Strike…, the political
unity of the proletariat is secured in the movement from the economic struggle
(with already-constituted classes and class-relations) to the political struggle in
which all other classes recognize their interests in the action of the proletariat.
Luxemburg’s understanding of the development of class-consciousness is a
constitutive one at the level of political reality.47 Contrary to this, Lenin’s theory
places the agential power of the proletarian revolution in the hands of a
representative body that fully understands the laws of history by asserting that
nation-wide political organization is a pre-condition of revolution.
B. Revolution against Economism?
At a first glance this may seem to imply that Lenin believes classes are not
exclusively determined by an autonomous economic realm–i.e., that the political
being of the class-struggle precedes its economic being. This perspective would,
however, overlook the fact that Lenin believes in independent laws of history and
societal development that are immanent in the economic struggle. Lenin is not
arguing that the vanguard party needs to invent the interests of the proletariat, but
rather that it can know the actual class interests of the proletariat as a distinct
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economic being and can use this knowledge to alter the course of history by
forging alliances with other classes that are exploited by the bourgeoisie but are
also given some societal privileges (e.g., the petty-bourgeoisie).48 Furthermore,
Lenin asserts that consciousness is built from the objective development of
history and is therefore only an expression of material reality.49 This
presupposition of epistemological immediacy of economic reality implies that the
party that is conscious of proletariat interests is merely the representative of this
actually existing revolutionary class and can act and lead in its favor without any
doubt as to the validity of this principle of ontological and epistemological
certainty and immediacy.
The key thing to remember about Russian Social Democracy, especially as its
theory was advanced by Lenin and Trotsky, is that it did not develop in an
advanced capitalist economy. The Russian state was still a centralized Tsarist
structure propped up by a powerful military presence that was opposed not only to
the proletarian revolution, but also to the bourgeois revolution which was to usher
in the age of capitalism.50 As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe argue, in
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics:
[I]n the struggle against absolutism, none of the Russian Social
Democratic analyses suggests that bourgeois tasks cease to be
bourgeois when they are assumed by the proletariat. Class identity
is constituted on the basis of the relations of production… Now,
the clarity of this [Marxist materialist] history is marred by the
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emergence of an anomaly: the bourgeois class cannot fulfil its role,
and this has to be taken over by another character…51
The success of the Tsarist state in thwarting a bourgeois revolution only pushes
the responsibility for this first revolution to the proletariat, which must then
incorporate a pseudo-bourgeois stage of development into its overall strategy. But
this does not imply that the interests of the bourgeoisie are transformed into
proletarian class interests, since these class interests are determined at the level of
relations of production. At the political level, however, the vanguard party which
represents the proletariat can be the concrete agent that carries out the class-tasks,
which are bourgeois by nature of the relations of production from which would
logically emerge. Leninism asserts the necessity for the vanguard party on the
basis of the extremely muddled stratification of classes that Marx acknowledged
in the third volume of Capital, as we saw in the previous chapter.52 This transition
of agential responsibility for historically necessary class-tasks is one basis for the
necessity of the class-alliance in Lenin. But the specificity of the link between
each class-task and its “natural” agent as it is determined by the economic
relations of production ensures that the vanguard party of the proletariat can
develop class-alliances without losing sight of or betraying the interests of the
proletariat.
This logic short-circuits the linear narrative of historical materialism, which
argues that the proletarian revolution can only be possible given a specific stage
of economic development–i.e., advanced industrial capitalism. The knowledge of
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the laws of historical development that the vanguard party acquires allows it to
determine another path toward the development of socialism in Russia that does
not follow the model laid out by Marx and Engels. This short-circuit, however,
does not imply that Lenin is breaking from the linear vision of history that guides
historical materialism. On the contrary, Laclau and Mouffe assert that
there is no specificity, either for Trotsky or for Lenin, which can
assure the survival of a Soviet Sate unless a socialist revolution
breaks out in Europe, unless the victorious working classes of the
advanced industrial countries come to the aid of the Russian
revolutionaries. Here the ‘abnormality’ of the dislocation of
[economic] stages [of development] in Russia links up with the
‘normal’ development of the West…53
In other words, the “break” that the Russian Social Democrats make with
economic determinism is limited exclusively to the material and historical
conditions of Russia as they are situated within a much broader framework of an
increasingly global capitalist system. Therefore, the validity of this Russian
theory of proletarian revolution is still predicated upon the logical necessity of an
orthodox revolution in the industrial West that follows the laws of historical
development as they were laid out by Marx and Engels.
Lenin’s theory of revolution, then, is not a revolution against the economic
determinism that seems to guide Marx’s Capital.54 On the contrary, the entire
theory only makes sense within a broader theory of economic determinism. The
Russian deviation from orthodox class-struggle through the formation of the
vanguard party and class-alliances is justified with reference to the way in which
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the historico-economic reality of Russia deviated from the “natural” development
of Marx’s historical theory. The revolution and the class-identities that drive it are
still profoundly tied up in an economic reality that ontologically precedes political
reality and is the essential basis for the latter.
III. Economic Reality and Class Identity
We have now seen that Lenin’s theory of proletarian politics posits the
necessity of the representative power of the vanguard party in securing a unified
political being of classes that will bring the proletariat to self-consciousness.
Luxemburg, on the other hand, argues that the political unity of the proletariat
could only be secured through the constitutive praxis of the “mass strike”–or
“revolution,” more broadly–which could not be directed by any representative
political party. These two theorists put forward very different political ideals for
the development of class-consciousness for the proletariat. The success of the
Russian revolution would ultimately secure a pride of place for Leninist political
theory in the Marxist tradition, but the marginalization of Luxemburg’s concept of
the constitutive formation of class-consciousness would not be forgotten by
Marxism and, indeed, her theory could be placed within a less statist Marxist
lineage that persists among radical theorists and political groups to the present
day.
Despite their different conclusions as to how the consciousness of the
proletariat must be developed, both of these thinkers begin to formulate the ideas,
which we explored above, as a part of a critique of more passive economistic
trends in the Social Democratic movements of Germany and Russia. Moreover,
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both Lenin and Luxemburg end up rooting the political being of the proletariat in
the economic sphere of reality–namely, where relations of production produce
definite classes that determine the shape of society through the class-struggle. For
both of them, then, the being of the proletariat as a class is a fact rooted in the
economy of which individual proletarians must become conscious in their
political life.
From what has just been said, it is clear that their critiques of economism do
not attempt to assert that classes are not ontologically rooted in economic
relations of production, but that the success of the proletarian revolution is not
guaranteed by the development of the economy. Rather, as Lenin and Luxemburg
both argue, the economic class-struggle must be given a political being or
assigned a political character in order for the proletariat to emerge as a
revolutionary force. But in each case the conditions of possibility for the
development of the political character of the class-struggle are secured by
economic developments: according to Luxemburg, it is the intolerable oppression
of workers in specific sites of production that will move them to politicize their
class-struggle by taking the mass strike to the streets, where it will symbolically
politicize other similar economic relations of oppression and usher in a general
revolution; according to Lenin, it is the fact that the bourgeoisie cannot develop
the definite relations of production necessary to bring about a proletarian
revolution that makes the vanguard party responsible for forming political classalliances that will further the class-interests of the proletariat. Moreover, the latter
theory only makes sense within the context of an increasingly global capitalist
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system from which principles of historical development can be extracted and
adapted for the abnormal Russian situation. The fact that these two thinkers
develop two radically different political programs out of such similar conditions is
not our concern here; the point to keep in mind is that it is only by theoretically
establishing an autonomous and determinate sphere of economic reality that these
early 20th century thinker can make sense of the multiple concepts of class that are
present in the works of Marx and Engels.
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Part 2: Class
through Social
Theory
Base/Superstructure Model and Beyond

42

4. Crisis of Base and
Superstructure
The Incompatibility of Economic Determinism with
Marx’s Theory of Exploitation

The ontological primacy that 20th century Marxism gave to the economic
sphere in determining the rest of social reality produces a dichotomy of social
reality. But this division of social reality is rooted in Marx’s assertion that the
character of society and every social development–from culture, politics, social
organization, and dominant modes of thought–can be explained and critiqued
through an examination of the material conditions of reality. This dictum
establishes a division between a material economic base, the functioning of which
determines the character of an institutional superstructure and its ideological
superstructural effects. This division between base and superstructure gave rise to
the idea that anyone who gave primary importance to superstructural elements in
any analysis was making the claim that ideas shape the world and not the inverse.
This is to say that analyses that attempt to explain a societal institution (such as
the prison system) or a mode of consciousness (such as the concept of criminality)
without reference to the economic mode of production in which they were
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situated were dismissed for failing to recognize that societal structures are
determined by the economy.55 Thus the distinction between base and
superstructure functioned practically as a rubric for recognizing theorists who
were enemies of the proletarian revolution. When theorists steeped in the Marxist
tradition began to depart from or challenge the importance of the economic/social
dichotomy, their work amounted to a betrayal in the eyes of the proponents of
traditional Marxist thought.56
This departure from the dichotomy, however, may not amount to a betrayal of
the ideas laid out by Marx himself. A close reading some of Marx’s works that
flesh out his critical materialist methodology–the German Ideology, the
Grundrisse, the Theses on Feuerbach, the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844, or the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right (to name only a few)–uncovers a different set of meanings in the phrase
“material conditions of reality” beyond exclusively economic relations. One could
return to Marx through any of these texts, but for the purposes of this analysis, I
will begin this Marxist “revolution” by returning to the work that is supposed to
justify the more positivist Marxist theories of economic essentialism–namely,
Capital.
Before returning to the writing of Marx, however, the topographical model for
understanding social reality that was hinted at by the political theories of
55
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Luxemburg and Lenin must be clarified in order to ensure that the following
critique recognizes its target and does not develop into a strawman argument. To
accomplish this, this chapter will begin by analyzing Louis Althusser’s “Ideology
and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)”–an essay
published in 1970 in a collection titled Lenin and Philosophy. This work presents
one of the clearest and most succinct elaborations on and illustrations of the
base/superstructure model. It will, therefore, serve as an excellent referent for the
argument of this chapter. Furthermore, its date of publication will serve as an
indication of the lasting legacy of the modes of thought presented in the first part
of this work. The analysis of Althusser’s work will thus serve to further the
argument of the preceding chapter–namely, that the theoretical development of
the economic sphere as an ontological plane of consistency for the concept of
classes holds true for modern Marxism.
I. Base and Superstructure
Althusser contends that the base/superstructure model is first put forward by
Marx as a model that represents the “social whole.”57 He is right to assert that the
division of social reality into a base and superstructure originates in Marx: in a
footnote to the first chapter of Capital, Marx writes that his
view is that each particular mode of production, and the relations
of production corresponding to it at each given moment, in short
the ‘economic structure of society’, is ‘the real foundation on
which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which
correspond definite forms of social consciousness’ and that the
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45

‘mode of production of material life conditions the general process
of social, political, and intellectual life.’58
Marx is arguing that institutions that are not immediately economic in their nature
are determined in their character by the mode of production. Furthermore, beyond
this institutional level, the superstructure is also made up of “definite modes of
social consciousness,” which will also be referred to in this work as
“superstructural effects.” There are, then, three layers or “floors” to social reality,
two of which are determined by the economic base: first there is the mode of
production itself which then determines the politico-legal level as well as the
ideological level.59
Asserting that the economic base determines all other layers of society is not to
say that superstructural institutions and effects do not play any role in determining
of social reality–the effects of the Tsarist state in early 20th century Russian
society, as they were analyzed by Lenin, would serve as an obvious counter
example to this. Rather, as Althusser argues, “It is possible to say that the floors
of the superstructure are not determinant in the last instance, but that they are
determined by the effectivity of the base; that if they are determinant in their own
(as yet undefined) ways, this is true only in so far as they are determined by the
base.”60 This more nuanced interpretation of the determinant character of the
superstructure fits well with the discussion of the logic of the necessity of the
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vanguard party discussed in the previous chapter. As we saw in the preceding
chapter, the capacity of the Russian proletariat to carry out a revolution without
the anterior development of bourgeois relations of production can only be
possible given the context of Russia’s location within a larger, increasingly
global, capitalist system–in other words, bourgeois relations of production and
circulation in other countries were naturally beginning to spread to Russia through
global networks of circulation and production.
From Althusser’s brief illustration of this social theory of the determinant
economic base and the determined societal superstructure I can draw a few key
points that will be helpful in setting up the rest of this chapter. First, the whole of
the economic mode of production determines or produces the specific character of
the societal superstructure. Second, Althusser asserts that the base/superstructure
model is a theory of the whole of social reality; therefore, to understand any
development of society it is necessary to first understand how it originates from
economic relations. Third, the superstructure splits into two levels: an institutional
state-centric level and an ethereal and decentered level of ideology, or, to borrow
Marx’s phrase, “definite modes of social consciousness.” These floors of the
superstructure can be determinant of social relations, but only in so far as the
superstructural levels themselves have already been determined by the economic
base. Fourth and finally, the economic sphere, I would conclude, is privileged
with a high level of autonomy and that all beings produced in other spheres of
society are rooted in that autonomous and already determined economic sphere.
The autonomy of the economic sphere with regard to the superstructures is the
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only way to explain why it is given such a determinate role in societal formation.
If the superstructure could effect profound changes of the economic base that did
not develop from the determinations of the base itself, then it would be impossible
to say that the economy is determinate of the social whole. With this argument in
mind, let us now turn to Capital and compare the economic theory contained
within that text with the topographical model that was just laid out. This will
allow me to evaluate the logical compatibility of the principle of economic
autonomy against Marx’s own theory of exploitation.

II. What is Capital?
A. The Importance of the Text
Capital has been seen by many as the most thorough and rigorous of Marx’s
critical analyses of capitalism. For this reason it has been considered something
like the authoritative and foundational text in the Marxist theory.61 The fact that
this methodical and comprehensive work was branded by its author as a scientific
treatise on capitalist economics inspired the positivistic developments of early
Marxism, which reified the base/superstructure dichotomy, seeing this as a
cornerstone of truth around which a rigorous scientific method of economic and
social critique could be built. And if we, who would place ourselves within the
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Marxist tradition, accept the insights of Marx himself as a valid starting point for
examining reality, then the position held by the positivists seems difficult to
depart from given the footnote to the first chapter of Capital cited above.62
Thankfully, for those who remain skeptical of economic determinism, an
argument against the positivistic interpretation of the base/superstructure
distinction (outlined above) can be drawn from Capital itself. To do this I will
have to examine the claims being made about the functioning of two particular
processes within the economic base: exchange and production. The development
of this examination will summarize Marx’s analysis of the economic operations of
capitalism, thereby acquainting the reader with key concepts of Marxist theory
(such as exploitation, fetishism, and value), and it will also situate the concept of
class within the broader framework of this critical theory.
B. The Commodity in the Market and the Factory
Though Marx is exceptionally critical of capitalism in Capital, the first guiding
question in the text is not “what is wrong with capitalism?”, but “what is
capital?”; his critique of political economy begins with an analysis of the nature
of political economy. In order to explore the question of the nature of capital,
Marx begins Capital with an analysis of the commodity, since “the wealth of
societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an
‘immense collection of commodities.’”63 The opening section of the text quickly
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dives into an analysis of the commodity’s two economic essences: use-value and
exchange-value. The former belongs to the actual physical body of the
commodity: the commodity is useful for others because of its physical traits. The
exchange-value is the measurement by which “use-values of one kind exchange
for use-values of another kind.”64 Both of these essences are similar in that they
are representations of abstract material relations. Use-values are only ever made
real through the process of the consumption of the commodity: a saw resting on
the wall has no real use-value until the lumber worker makes use of it to fell a
tree. Use-value, then, is actualized in the relation between commodities and
people: this particular relation is one of consumption by which a product of labor
is taken out of circulation in order to produce value for the consumer.
Additionally, with the use of the term “value,” Marx is referring to an exclusively
economic sense of activity. There may be other “values,” more broadly conceived
– e.g., in the saw when it is resting on the wall – but these are not values that
make the saw a commodity per se.
Though the example of a saw and a lumber worker may strike the reader as
more of a process of production than one of consumption, the two are in fact
closely related and oftentimes two sides of the same material process.65 “Labor
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uses up its material elements… It consumes them and therefore is a process of
consumption.”66 The commodity as use-value enters the scene of production as
the means of production that laborers utilize in order to produce wealth. My
example of the saw-worker-tree relation not only clarifies the relational nature of
use-values, but also introduces us to the differentiated processes located at the
economic base–in this case, production and consumption–and shows us that these
processes often occur simultaneously in the same material activity. Looked at one
way, the utilization of the saw to cut down a tree is a non-exhaustive consumption
of the saw’s use-value. Looked at from another angle, the process of cutting the
tree is one of harvesting timber as a commodity; it is, therefore, also the
production of an exchange-value.
Exchange-value’s realization is located in a different series of relations and is
wrapped up in different economic processes. Because exchange-value is a
measurement of what quantity of one commodity can be exchanged for a quantity
of another commodity, this value materializes in the process of circulation in the
market as a relation between different commodities. The circulation of
commodities in economies built around the consumption of use-values follows a
pattern in which a commodity is exchanged for money that is then exchanged for
another commodity (C-M-C’, where C represents a commodity, C’ represents a
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qualitatively different commodity, and M represents money). The exchange-value
is present in this mode of exchange only as a means of trading one use-value for
another. Circulation is intended to maximize the satisfaction of needs of
consumers; it ends when commodities are consumed and the needs of the
consumers are satisfied.
The mode of circulation in capitalism follows a different pattern–namely, one
in which money is exchanged for a commodity that is then exchanged for more
money (M-C-M’, where M’ represents a transformed exchange-value). (If it is an
efficient exchange, then M’ will represent a greater exchange-value than M).67 In
this model of circulation, the attainment of money as the signifier of exchangevalue is the chief concern of economic agents, which is why Marx refers to
exchange-value simply as value, as will be done in this work from now on. In
capitalism, the circulation of commodities is not done for consumption and the
satisfaction of needs, but in order to generate more wealth. Individual
commodities may go through a number of exchanges before being consumed and
exiting the sphere of circulation. This means that, in capitalist economies,
commodities fulfil their purpose when they are sold on the market and not when
they are consumed and thus leave the economic sphere. In capitalism, therefore,
the mode of circulation begins to play a more important economic role than it did
in economies organized around the consumption and exchange of the use-values
of commodities.
Circulation and exchange are mediated by money, which functions as the
representative of value. Whatever the material substance of the money67
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commodity may be–gold, silver, paper, digitized data–its use-value is derived
from its designation as the universal measurement of equivalence among all other
commodities. In this sense, it is a symbol. But this is not wholly unique to money,
because “every commodity is a symbol, since, as value, it is only the material
shell of human labor expended on it.”68 This is because the value of a commodity
is derived from the cost of the raw materials and the use-value of the labor that
produced it. Thus, what is made equivalent in exchange value is general human
labor in the abstract: if the raw materials and (simple) labor-time for a couch and
an ax cost the same amount, then they would have the same value. Thus, what
money really symbolizes is the equivalence of abstract labor time invested in each
commodity. Therefore, as the mediator of the exchange of commodities, money is
the value-form of commodities–a symbol of value alone and therefore a symbol of
abstract human labor.
Marx emphasizes the fact that value is a measure of abstract human labor
because in order for two qualitatively different commodities to be exchanged, the
qualitative differences of the labor that produced them must be negated or
ignored. For an ax to be equivalent in value to a vase, not only must the cost of
the labor and raw materials be equal, but the differences between glassblowing
and ax making must also be considered inconsequential to the value of the
objects. Value is a measurement of a quantity of labor-time abstracted from the
particularities of each type of labor. Labor-power, from which value is derived, is
then the average productivity of an unskilled individual producer. But, to find the
average productivity of a worker, one must first find the productivity of a mass of
68
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workers and then evenly divide this for each of the individuals in the mass. Value
is, therefore, a measurement of abstract individual labor-power only after it is a
measure of abstract social labor.
C. Fetishism
We have now discovered that our earlier claim–namely, that value is realized
in circulation as a direct relation equating different commodities to one another in
order to facilitate their exchange–is false. Arguing against this understanding of
exchange-value, Marx asserts that “the commodity-form, and the value-relation of
the products of labor within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with
the physical nature of the commodity... It is nothing but the definite social relation
between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a
relation between things.”69 What the earlier formulation of the value of
commodities hides is the fact that value is the product of social processes, i.e., the
work of human beings, and is not something that emerges naturally from things
exchanged. This displacement of the source of value in things and not in the
producers of things is what Marx calls commodity fetishism and its result is the
mediation of circulation and exchange through the use of money as the universal
equivalent of the value of commodities. The simplest expression of the economic
effect of fetishism is the alienation of use-value for exchange-value and the
alienation of the source of value–i.e., labor.
Money’s mediation of exchange hides the double abstraction of value from the
consciousness of economic agents. This double abstraction is: 1) the commodity’s
symbolization of the cost of the labor-time involved in its production, and 2)
69
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money’s symbolization of that cost as a measurement of the value of the
commodity. The result is that the idea of value is separated from the material
body of the valuable thing and this valuable thing is abstracted from the social
process of its production from which the specificity of its actual value originates.
This issue is succinctly summarized by Slavoj Žižek when he states that “during
the act of exchange, individuals proceed as if the commodity is not submitted to
physical material changes; as if it is excluded from the natural cycle of generation
and corruption…”70 Because the abstraction of value is a presupposition of
exchange in capitalism, fetishism does not simply facilitate exchange; indeed, by
separating value from both the physical body of the commodity and the social
process that produced it, fetishism makes exchange possible.
Borrowing from Marx’s language that established the groundwork for the
base/superstructure dichotomy, fetishism is clearly a “definite form of social
consciousness.” According to the original formula that Marx gave us for the
base/superstructure dichotomy, definite forms of social consciousness correspond
to the legal and political superstructure of society, which arises from the
economic foundation. Because of the determining influence of fetishism at this
point of the economic base, economic determinism is now confronted with a
seemingly insurmountable challenge: how can a superstructural effect like
fetishism play such a central role in the operations of the economic base when the
economic base is supposed to determine the social institutions and practices that
produce fetishism in the first place? The inconsistency of this social model with
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Marx’s own theory of capitalism erodes the ontological ground on which classes
were situated in the preceding chapter.
To escape this contradiction and to rescue an ontological foundation for
classes, we must either argue that fetishism is not so causally important in
capitalist economics, or we must rethink the concept of a base/superstructure
dichotomy. Though I have no interest in defending the economic determinist
mode of thinking, I will have to examine the objections that proponents of this
view would raise with respect to what has been argued to this point. Doing so will
simultaneously allow me to explore the character of fetishism further.
III. Critiques and Responses
A. Failure to Grasp Production as the Economic Real?
The first possible objection that could be raised against the reducto ad
absurdum that this paper has built–i.e., that orthodox economic determinism is
incompatible with Marx’s own economic theory–is that too much importance has
been given to the money fetishism that manifests at the level of exchange, but is
actually produced at a deeper level–namely, in the sphere of economic
production. In other words, the orthodox Marxist would claim that this analysis
has only dealt with the surface of capitalism, the market, and has divorced it from
the real matter of the capitalist system, the factory. In some sense this critique of
the preceding argument would be a reductionist position since it would limit the
economic base solely to the realm of production. This would mean that in the
Marxist topography of social reality, the market would have to be considered
alongside legal and political institutions as another aspect of the superstructure,
albeit one more closely related to the determining sphere of material reality.
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This position must be rejected because production clearly presupposes a
market in which goods can be exchanged, so that compensation can be secured for
workers and profits generated for capitalists. Were there no market until
production determined its character, then there would be no way to purchase the
means of production needed to produce goods that could be used by commodity
owners to establish the first markets. Marx himself states that products of labor
“are not as yet commodities, but become so only through the act of exchange.”71
Production in capitalism is done to produce commodities as exchange values, so
to relegate the market to the superstructure would be senseless and only imply a
greater causal role for superstructural forces in the operation of the economic
base.
This problem brings us back to the simultaneity of differentiated economic
processes in the same material activity (e.g., my earlier analysis of the lumber
worker-saw-tree relation, which is both the consumption of the use-value of the
ax by the worker and the production of lumber that will enter the market as a
value). In this case, however, there is the presupposition of different and
simultaneous material activities (which may be made up of simultaneous
economic processes) in order for one economic process to make sense. The
market is a fundamental sphere of capitalist economics and not outside of it. If we
were to arbitrarily locate the market in the superstructure, this would not save the
base/superstructure dichotomy, but only further problematize it given the fact that
the market would nonetheless be so intertwined with the realm of production. The
simultaneity of economic processes is what makes an autonomous economic
71
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sphere thinkable in the first place. The superstructure would be entering the
economic base in a more pervasive way if we limited the economic base to the
sphere of production alone.
B. Fetish and Fantasy
A second objection to the importance of fetishism in the economic base would
be to assert that fetishism is not necessary for capitalism to function, though it
does allow it to function more effectively. This argument would assert that the
superstructural effects of fetishism have an economic purpose, but that its
economic effects would not be a driving force in capitalism. In this line of
reasoning, the money fetish would be like pavement on the road to market:
economic actors can bring commodities to the market (which already presupposes
the process of production, since these actors would be traveling to the market
from the factory–i.e., the site of production) and engage in exchange there without
the pavement, but this pavement smooths out any roughness in the “path to the
market”–from the sphere of production–and it exists for this reason alone. The
problem with this objection is that money fetishism is not simply a pavement that
smooths out a pocked road to the market: it is 1) the ground on which the
capitalist market and its model of circulation–M-C-M’–stands, and, 2) also the
very road from the factory to the market and vice versa. Let us look at these two
characteristics of fetishism in turn.
With respect to the first point, fetishism allows us to accept money as the
representative of value without looking back on the series of abstractions that
produced it. In that chain of abstraction, money is a symbol of the qualitatively
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equivalent value in commodities, and the value of a commodity is itself a symbol
of the labor expended in its production. But the labor symbolized in the
commodity is not the specific labor belonging to particular laborers; it is abstract
individual labor-power, which is only quantitatively arrived at after calculating
some general value for untrained social productive labor as a whole. It is only
because money fetishism allows us to ignore this chain of abstractions by which
value is inextricably linked to the material social reality of production that
individual economic agents can act as though money is the universal and
immaterial body of value. Commodity/money fetishism, which is built into the
very form of the commodity, is what allows us to participate in an economy built
around the production and exchange of commodities (so that the capitalist may
accumulate more money) without reflecting on the material roots of value, which
would necessitate the realization that money and, by extension, the commodity
have no value in themselves.72 If daily economic activity reflected this
knowledge, then the circularity inherent in the capitalist system would become
apparent. Buying commodities with money in order to sell those commodities for
more money–M-C-M’, the capitalist model of circulation–would be exposed as a
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redundant system built around expanding value without recognizing that value is
originally only a measurement of equivalence of use-values between
commodities. Without money fetishism, use-value would be revealed as the
primary form of value in a commodity, since value is derived from use-value.
Rational economic agents (mythic beings whose existence the original theorists of
capitalism presupposed) would lose faith in money as the universal embodiment
of value and economic activity would have to be adjusted accordingly: the model
of circulation and exchange would become C-M-C’. This is to say that the
satisfaction of needs would take precedence over the expansion of wealth.
At this point, it is worth pointing out that money fetishism does not primarily
function at the level of individual consciousness, but at the level of social
consciousness. Marx asserts that the principle ideological result of fetishism is
that people treat money as the actual body of wealth (value) “without being aware
of it.”73 This claim would be almost absurd if it were made only at the level of the
consciousness of the individual. After all, one can understand that money is
worthless in and of itself while still using it to actually purchase goods.
The point is not that fetishism is an idea influencing the consciousness of
individuals, but that it is a fantasy structuring social reality itself. Individual
consciousness emerges from, or is the product of, social reality. Žižek
compellingly articulates this point when he argues that the problem is not that
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people cannot understand the chain of abstraction hidden behind the fetishistic
illusion, but rather that
in their social activity itself, in what they are doing, they are acting
as if money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of
wealth as such… What they ‘do not know’, what they
misrecognize, is the fact that in their social reality itself, in their
social activity–in the act of commodity exchange–they are guided
by the fetishistic illusion.74
What is being posited by Žižek is a dislocation of ideology from the
consciousness of individuals to its existence as a real material force in social
reality. Ideology is such a pervasive social force that recognizing and identifying,
at the level of individual consciousness, structural flaws, which are located at the
level of social reality, is simply not enough fix these flaws. Social consciousness
is produced through social action and, therefore, in order to change social reality
we must change the very ways in which we act. This is one key truth that
fetishism keeps us from grasping.75
Now, in turning to the second characteristic of fetishism identified above, I can
say that, by hiding the truth of the chain of abstractions from the conscious
activity of economic agents, fetishism also obscures the fact that capitalism is
inherently exploitative of labor. We must remember that the model of exchange in
capitalist circulation follows the model M-C-M’. M’ is equal to M + MΔ, where
M is the original value of the commodity and MΔ is the change in value of the
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commodity.76 Furthermore, M’ is supposed to represent more money than M if the
exchange is profitable (as all good capitalist exchanges ought to be), and, for this
reason, Marx calls MΔ “surplus-value”. The commodity at the heart of the
exchange is really only there to facilitate the circulation of money according to
the capitalist model. Therefore, when we remove this intermediary from the
model, we are left with the formula M-M’, or, in Marx’s words, “‘money which
begets money’, such is the description of capital given by its first interpreters, the
Mercantilists.”77 We have now arrived at the answer to the question I posed in the
second section of this chapter–namely, “what is capital?” Capital is money that
begets money; it is the wealth (value) invested in the production of surplus-value.
This surplus value (MΔ) is converted into M’ in exchange, but this conversion
cannot be located at the sphere of circulation. Certainly a commodity could be
bought by one person and sold to another for a higher price, thereby generating
profit, but at the level of an economic system–at the level of social reality–this
practice cannot be the source of social capital, since there will be a loss of wealth
on the part of the second person engaged in the exchange that is equivalent to the
gain of the first participant. Something material must be added to the commodity
in order for it to be sold at a higher price than that at which it was bought.
This brings the investigation of the origin of surplus value out of the sphere of
circulation and into the sphere of production. Since the commodity is the
expression of material and social relations of production, the value of a
commodity cannot increase without an augmentation of the social/material
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processes that produced it. In other words, something must be added to the
commodity for its value to increase. In order to be exchanged for M’, the
commodity must actually leave the market and enter the site of production as a
raw material to be consumed by labor in the production of a new commodity.
Because I am now jumping to a different sphere of the economic base, which is as
yet untouched territory for this analysis, I will have to provide an outline of
Marx’s theory of surplus-labor, from which surplus-value is derived.
IV. MΔ’s Mirror and Origin: Surplus-Labor
Production in capitalism revolves around private ownership of the means of
production. As we saw in chapter 2, those who own the tools used to produce
commodities are capitalists. Capitalists utilize their wealth to hire those who have
no source of wealth other than their labor-power. Class position is thus
determined by one’s relation to the means of production: if you own the means of
production and employ workers, you are a capitalist; if you sell your labor to the
capitalist and produce commodities for him, you are a proletarian. Summarizing
what we learned about class from chapters 2 and 3, class positions are derived
from the structure of the economic base. The class relations that define an
economic system are mediated by the means of production. This is to say that, in
capitalism, the means of production forms the intermediary objective base upon
which class relations are built. When a specific power-relation, ownership, is
applied to the intermediary object, class positions come into being. In order to
understand class positions, one must determine the principle of ownership of the
means of production and understand how the products of labor are appropriated.
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I have already discussed the abstract valuation of labor-power, but have not yet
fully emphasized that this abstract value is an exchange-value: (would-be)
workers and capitalists first meet in the labor market where the workers sell the
capitalists the one commodity they own in order to secure some means of
subsistence (in the form of wages–in the form of money). Therefore, “the value of
labor-power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the
maintenance of its owner.”78 In other words, labor-power is valued according to
the cost of satisfying the needs of workers sufficiently enough to sustain their
productive capabilities.79 The workers then make use of the capitalists’ means of
production in order to shape raw-materials into refined commodities. It is in this
actual economic activity of production that the use-value of the workers’ labor
emerges and is consumed. It is from this difference between actual and potential,
use and exchange, that surplus value is extracted: “The fact that half a day’s labor
is necessary to keep a worker alive for 24 hours does not in any way prevent him
from working a whole day.”80 The capitalist compensates a worker for day’s work
with a day’s means of subsistence, but the actual productivity of the worker
outpaces the value of the labor-power exchanged.
An entirely new series of relations immanent in the capitalist model of
circulation now comes to light. To understand the importance of these new
relations, I will rework Marx’s model of capitalist exchange, which is revealed to
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have a far more complex form than M-C-M’. On the market, the capitalist
exchanges money (M) for a commodity (C), which becomes raw material for the
production of a more valuable commodity. It is at this point that the commodity
leaves the market and enters the factory. However, in order to produce this second
commodity, the capitalist must first enter the labor market where he exchanges
money (M) simultaneously for labor-power (L) and the means of production (P).
Within the factory, the consumption of both labor-power and the means of
production yields the use-value of labor, or “surplus-labor” (L’). This surplus
labor then produces the more valuable commodity (C’), which then returns to the
market where it is sold and exchanged for more money (M’).
The true representation of exchange now appears as M-C-<{M-(L+P)}-[L’C’]>-M’:81 The relation symbolized inside the curly brackets represents activity
on the labor market and the relation inside the square brackets represents the
activity of production. The symbols that are not bound represent the visible
components model of exchange in capitalism and the stages bound by the arrows
represent the steps of the production of value that are hidden by fetishism, which,
it turns out, make up the vast majority of the value-form of capital. The big takeaway is this: capitalists pay workers enough to maintain their productivity and
appropriate the actual value they produce, which is greater than the cost of their
means of subsistence. In this sense, the expanded model of capitalist circulation–a
chain that incorporates production–is also the model of capitalist exploitation.
The fetishism of money, which abstracts value from its material root, also hides
this exploitative nature of the circulation of labor and production by hiding the
81
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most essential links in the chain: <{M-L+P}-[L’-C’]>. Thanks to money
fetishism, “the seller of labor-power, like the seller of any other commodity,
realizes its exchange-value, and alienates its use-value.”82 The money fetish does
not simply lubricate the capitalist machine: it functions as the machine’s source of
power.
There are a few powerful lessons to be learned from our journey through the
economic underworld that is the sphere of production. First, production ought to
be seen as a phase in the larger model of capitalist circulation. To exclude the
links <{M-L+P}-[L’-C’]> from the formula of circulation is to completely ignore
the role of labor and its exploitation in capitalism. If we simply accept the model
M-C-M’, then we deny labor any agency and produce a fetishistic
misrepresentation of the structure of social reality. Second, fetishism blinds
workers to the real value of their labor, i.e., its use-value. Workers see money as
the embodiment of value divorced from the social relations that produced it and
thus fail to see that all exchange-value is merely the representation of equivalence
between use-values; they fail to recognize use-value as the real root of value.
Workers are compensated solely for the cost of the means of subsistence
necessary for them to function as a means of production for the capitalist. This
means that workers are paid a representation of value (wages as money) that is
equivalent to the value of the social labor expended in the production of the
means of subsistence that had to be consumed in order to maintain their continued
productive existence. In other words, the value of the workers’ wages is a
measurement of equivalence of use-values. This is the definition of exchange82
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value. It is the power of the money fetish that leads workers to alienate the usevalue of their labor for the exchange-value of their labor-power on the labor
market.
Third, without fetishism the capitalist mode of circulation would be regarded
as wildly irrational and unjust. To say that all capital is derived from the
production of surplus-value is to say that all capital is built by surplus-labor,
which is derived from the exploitation of workers by the capitalist. This mode of
production does not serve the interests of all members of society, only those who
own the means of production. The continued participation of labor in this
exploitative system is therefore irrational and necessary for the functioning of
capitalism. Fourth and finally, the fact that the entire economic base relies on a
superstructural effect demands that we rethink the conceptual validity and value
of the base/superstructure dichotomy. But before forging ahead with this task, one
final critique must be considered.
V. A Final Critique: A Defense of History
A critic may finally object to the analysis laid out thus far by claiming that my
understanding of fetishism is fundamentally ahistorical. This softer economic
determinist, a dialectical historian, would assert that fetishism is not uniquely
rooted in capitalist economic practice; after all, Marx himself cites Aristotle’s
critique of money fetishism in his analysis of the capitalist model of circulation.83
This dialectical historical position would rightly assert that there was no social
state of nature in which capitalism functioned solely as an economic mode of
production that then produced all other aspects of society later. Instead, this critic
83
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would posit that capitalism emerged from a larger history made up of a succession
of modes of production. Fetishism would simply be a “tradition of all past
generations [that] weighs like a nightmare upon the brain of the living.”84 The
existence of fetishism would not need to be explained solely within a capitalist
paradigm in order for it to be considered a superstructural effect. This particular
superstructural effect can be seen as the echo of a material economic force when
its theoretically primordial origins are kept in mind. This objection would at least
grant some causal power to superstructural effects like fetishism, but only after it
is made clear that they have their own specific economic origins. In this sense, the
positivist deployment of the base/superstructure concept has already been
rethought. This revision, however, has not gone far enough.
Though this criticism is right to point out that capitalism emerged from a
dynamic historical process, it is wrong to assert that the money and commodity
fetishism that drives the capitalist economy existed as a definite social
consciousness before capitalism. As we have already discovered, there is an
important distinction to be made between fetishism as a “definite social
consciousness” and the individual behavior of fetishism. With Žižek’s help, we
discovered that social consciousness is produced through social action. Fetishism
as a definite mode of social consciousness is an ideological fantasy that structures
economic practice and, for this reason, is located firmly in what has been referred
to as the economic base. Of course, there are examples of money fetishists
throughout history, but, by and large, the fetishistic fantasy was not a dominant
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mode of social consciousness. The moneylender that Aristotle criticizes does not
derive his wealth from workers who willingly alienate the use-value of their labor
for the exchange-value of their labor-power. There is certainly pervasive
economic exploitation in the Athenian economy; however, the exploitation of
labor is not defined by the relation of wage-slavery, but by actual slavery. The
slave’s reality does not need to be, and perhaps cannot be, structured by the
fetishistic fantasy when they are so overtly exploited by material power relations.
“A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician
binds them even more strongly by the chain of their own ideas… on the soft fibers
of the brain is founded the unshakable base of the soundest of Empires.”85 Slaveowners in Athens were “stupid despots,” but the capitalist is a true politician.86
Certainly in Athens there were individuals who engaged in fetishistic practices,
but it was not a definite mode of social consciousness structuring all of social
reality.
Let me not restrict my counterexamples to Classical Greece. The Medieval
Catholic Church outlawed money lending.87 In the case of the Church, since it
was official religious doctrine, it was heretical to charge interest on loans of
money. The reason for this was that there is no material basis on which the
interest on the loan could be justified. The Catholic state apparatus regarded
making money from money as a dangerous sin. The production of capital and the
money fetishism on which it is based was the work of the devil.
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Additionally, the dominant economic mode of production for the late medieval
period, feudalism, did not produce fetishism as a mode of social consciousness.
The static hierarchy of the feudal system was not built around a principle of
exchanging commodities for money. The aristocratic class exploited the labor of
the mass of agricultural peasants, who had to produce enough goods to satisfy
their own needs as well as the needs of the knights who “watched over” them. The
peasants had no say in this. They could not move or change professions. Peasants
were born into servitude and died in servitude. They did not see compensation for
their labor, but only received tenants’ rights to farmland and the promise of
protection from the lord to whom they were loyal, and only so long as they were
loyal. For the vast majority of people in the feudal system, money hardly entered
their world except to buy use-values that they would consume. Properly speaking,
commodities did not exist in this mode of production, since a product of labor
only becomes a commodity after it has been exchanged in the sphere of
circulation.
By overlooking these key differences between capitalism and previous
economic epochs, and by ignoring the distinction between fetishism as an
economic practice and fetishism as a definite mode of social consciousness, my
critic would not have presented a defense of history, but a fundamental
misrepresentation of the interplay of history and economics. The recognition of
the fact that fetishism is a definite mode of social consciousness that is unique to
the capitalist mode of production is at the same time a recognition and a defense
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of the dynamic movement of history. With this last response, the economic
determinist position has been sufficiently destabilized, if not refuted altogether.
VI. Dissolution of Base and Superstructure
The preceding analysis reveals that the strict base/superstructure division is not
a viable concept. Commodity fetishism, a superstructural effect according to the
traditional Marxist formulation of the base/superstructure dichotomy, must
necessarily be presupposed as a precondition of capitalist economic activity if
Marx’s theory of exploitation is to make any sense. Moreover, this fetishism
cannot be presupposed as an ideological specter of a previous economic epoch
that allowed for the passage from feudalism to capitalism, since as a definite
mode of social consciousness, it must be a product of social labor organized
around the production of exchange-values and the alienation of use-values. The
feudal mode of production, however, was organized around the production of usevalues. Commodity fetishism, as a definite mode of social consciousness, is
uniquely linked to the bourgeois mode of production both as a paradoxical
precondition and as a product. That is to say that capitalism requires that the
practice of all social agents–proletarians and capitalists, as well as those
belonging to other classes existing alongside this central class-antagonism (the
dangerous class and the petty-bourgeoisie that we encountered in chapter 2)–
reinforce and be driven by the ideological fetishism of the exchange-value of the
commodity.
By now, it should not be a secret that at the heart of the base/superstructure
dichotomy was a claim made about the way in which reality fundamentally
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functions. If everything we observe in the social can be explained exclusively
with recourse to economic activity, then theorists need only unpack the total set of
determining economic relations so that revolutionaries can go about
deconstructing and reorganizing all of reality. One cannot help delighting in the
pragmatic optimism of a political theory that posited an attainable and
unquestionable truth in the form of an autonomous and determinate economic
Real, which could be used to bring about a more just world. In some sense, it is
unfortunate that there is no autonomous economic base, at least not in the simple
terms that the positivist Marxists envisioned it. We must now ask if this is truly
how Marx envisioned his metaphysical/epistemological division of the social.
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5. A New Topography of Social
Reality
Towards a New Ontological Foundation for Class
The question that has been central to this work is a question of the political
ontology of the concept of class. We have seen how the term does not designate a
coherent conceptual unity in the writing of Marx and Engels, and also how the
multiple concepts of class have haunted Marxist thought throughout the 20th
century. For a brief moment, it appeared that we had at least found a plane of
consistency for the various concepts of class in the autonomous and determinate
sphere of the economy. However, the analysis of the last chapter demonstrated the
incompatibility of Marx’s theory of capitalist economics with economic
determinist models of Marxism and, in doing so, revealed that the tidy distinction
between the infrastructure (economy or private sphere) and the superstructure
(public sphere or all society aside from the economy) is not a valid topography of
social reality. Moreover, not only “class,” but also “society” and “capitalism”
became floating signifiers with the dissolution of this Marxist topography.
The intertwining of the ideological and the economic aspects of society forces
us to seek a new model of understanding the “social whole,” as Althusser phrased
it. I will begin again by returning to some writings of Marx and Engels via
Michael Halewood’s Rethinking the Social through Durkheim, Marx, Weber, and
Whitehead to understand how Marx and Engels discuss social reality before it is
filtered through a theory of economic determinism. In this section of the chapter, I
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will develop a new distinction between the concepts of sociality and society
deployed by Marx and Engels. After establishing a new terminology and using it
to develop a rudimentary topography of social reality, the forthcoming analysis
will look to Étienne Balibar, as well as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in order
to make sense of the position of class within this new framework.
I. The Social/Societal Distinction
The distinction between the social and society lays the groundwork for a
theory of historical change and continuity in the absence of a model built from a
base/superstructure distinction. The two are linked, then, in their conceptual
purposiveness. But one should not simply understand this new distinction as a sort
of rewording of the same problem in Marxist political theory. The
base/superstructure was a vertical model of society in which the upper level was
always determined by the movement of the lower level. This lower level was the
mode of production, and the development of the economy was guided by a
dialectical logic that would be reproduced at the level of politics and society more
broadly. This means that economic determinism gets translated into historical
determinism in which the success of the proletarian revolution is guaranteed by
the logical development of the mode of production.88 For the purposes of this
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argument, this deterministic logic will not play a role in the development of the
distinction between the social and society.
This illustration of the social/societal distinction will build on Michael
Halewood’s terminological analysis of the use of the words “social,” “societal,”
and “society” by Marx and Engels. Halewood’s work reveals that this distinction
between the social and society is at least somewhat present at the origins of the
Marxist tradition. His terminological dissection begins with a rereading of A
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In this work, Marx
uses two words for “society”: “gesellschaft” and “sozietät.” The former was used
by Hegel to define “civil society,” while the latter does not appear in Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right at all. The term’s absence from the work Marx is critiquing
indicates that Marx’s use of sozietät is driving at a differentiated meaning
between the two, and this difference allows Marx to highlight another aspect of
social reality. As Halewood writes, “[s]ozietät has the connotation of a local, joint
practice, which does not have a set of rules but comes about through common
interests.”89 Later Halewood adds, that: “[b]y deploying a term which Hegel does
not use, Marx is distancing himself from the apparently rational but wholly
theoretical account that Hegel is attempting to construct. Marx wants to bring in
the messy but real, material, lives of individuals which, in an important way, also
make them what they are.”90 So, it appears that in using sozietät, Marx is
attempting to differentiate the ideal structure of the concept of society from the
actual and overdetermined play of material forces out of which a society emerges.
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Halewood goes on to argue that the fact that “sozietät” is used most frequently
with reference to feudal society indicates that the Marx’s usage of the term lines
up with an historical development from “sozietät” to “civil society.” Marx states
that “in the Middle Ages property, trade, society [sozietät], man are political;…
every private sphere has a political character or is a political sphere; that is,
politics is a characteristic of the private spheres too.”91 Civil society, on the other
hand, is characterized by an “abstract dualism” through which individual citizens
become split between their freedom in private life (economic activity) and their
subjection to a state apparatus that appears outside of that life (the public realm).92
To summarize Halewood’s argument thus far, “gesellschaft” refers to “society” in
the limited sense of “civil society” or “bourgeois society,” while “sozietät” refers
to the underlying social reality out of which bridges the public and private spheres
in previous epochs. Halewood asserts that by using sozietät in this way, Marx is
highlighting that Hegel’s understanding of “society” as “gesellschaft” is specific
to an historical epoch: the age of capitalism. The distinction between public and
private that is tied in with “gesellschaft” is, then, both an abstraction and an
historical reality–the public/private division is a defining feature of capitalist
society.
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The rationale behind the gesellschaft/sozietät split is complicated and clarified
in passages of The German Ideology where Marx uses both terms to refer to
communist society. As Halewood Argues:
Marx envisages communist society in terms of Gesellschaft not
Sozietät. That is, communism, considered as a society, is not a
return to a previous societal formation but shares features of
modern capitalist society. More important though is the retention
of the adjective sozial to express the difference between “free”
social activity and the objectification of such social activity which
becomes external to us, returns to haunt us, in the societal
formation of the historical development of societies up until now…
It would seem that within communism we could indulge our social
(sozial) activities even if communism is conceived of as a society
in terms of Gesellschaft.93
We can see that a conception of society as sozietät and a conception of society as
gesellschaft are not as distinct as the analysis of the Contribution to the Critique
of Political Economy would suggest. If gesellschaft is an historical development
unique to capitalist society, then it does not necessarily supplant sozietät. Sozietät
represents a qualitatively different form of society that can intersect or overlap
with gesellschaft. Neither is reducible to the other.
Halewood argues that by linking sozietät and gesellschaft to their respectively
correlated adjectives (sozial and gesellschaftlich), we can begin to understand
how the two are differentiated. Earlier in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels
provide a brief clarification of their use of gesellschaftlich:
By soci[et]al [gesellschaftlich] we understand the co-operation of
several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what
manner, and to what end… [A] certain mode of production… is
always combined with a certain mode of cooperation, or soci[et]al
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[gesellschaftlicher] stage… the multitude of productive forces
accessible to men determines the nature of society.94
From this passage I can say that, at least as it is deployed in The German
Ideology, gesellschaft is a neutral and transhistorical term referring to the idea of
society in general and not to the specific societal form in a given historical epoch;
it is the mode of cooperation considered in the abstract and not under specific
conditions. Furthermore, because of the vague definition of “societal” as
cooperation of individuals in any matter toward any end, I can add that this
definition of the mode of cooperation is not essentially economic, though it plays
a central role in economic activity.
The more interesting lesson that should be drawn out of this definition of
gesellschaftlich is the fact that it is the “multitude of productive forces accessible
to men” that determines the character of a gesellschaft. This is remarkable when
considered alongside the definition for “social power” (“soziale Macht”) that
Marx and Engels provide a few pages later: “The social power [soziale Macht],
i.e., the multiple productive force, which arises through the co-operation of
different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour…”95 In the
preceding paragraph the gesellschaft was determined by “the multitude of
productive forces” which, as we have now seen, is the definition of sozial macht.
And yet now it appears that the sozial power is itself determined by the general
division of labor. It would seem, then, that society is determined by social power,
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which is determined by economic structure and that this search for a new
topography of the social beyond the base/superstructure has only resurrected the
economic determinism that failed us earlier–with the incredibly important caveat
that we have now found an intermediary between the economic base and the
ideological and institutional superstructure in the movement of social power.
Such a reading, however, would miss the crucial context for the definition of
sozial Macht within The German Ideology. In the full passage, Marx and Engles
are actually saying that when the accessibility of the multitude of productive
forces to men is determined by the division of labor, social power
appears to these individuals, since their cooperation is not
voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united
power, but as an alien force existing outside them… which they
thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a
peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the
action of man.96
The spontaneous movement of gesellschaft is therefore secured by the alienation
of individuals from the soziale macht, which is rooted in their cooperative
conjunction with the multitude of productive forces. Furthermore, “this mode of
cooperation is itself a ‘productive force’”–i.e., both societal and economic.97
The societal (gesellschaftlich) mode of cooperation is a productive force that
makes possible the multiplication of other productive forces. The societal mode of
cooperation should be thought of as the prism through which other productive
forces must pass in order to be multiplied and thereby to constitute social power.
The alienation of social power from individuals, who comprise the societal mode
of cooperation, originates from the division of labor–a societal limitation imposed
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on the free social activity of individuals. This means that social power is not
determined by the division of labor in the sense that the latter produces the
former, but in the sense that it limits the potential form of social power. In other
words, it would be better to say that though the division of labor conditions social
power, the sociality from which social power is derived, is irreducible to the
structure of the economic mode of production.
II. Nature
In order to further develop an understanding of the interplay of these concepts
of social reality, it may be important to briefly depart from Halewood’s analysis
and note a distinction between the two German words that are translated as
“nature” in the English versions of The German Ideology–namely, “zustand” and
“natur.” The word used earlier in the German Ideology to assert that “the
multitude of productive forces” (soziale macht) determines the nature of society,
as gesellschaft, is “zustand,” which is commonly translated as “state” or
“condition.” Thus it is bears a more temporary or contingent meaning than the
English use of nature in a phrase like the “state of nature,” for example. However,
when Marx and Engels are discussing the way in which individuals see their
social power as something alien because “their cooperation is not voluntary but
has come about naturally,” the German word that is translated as “naturally” is
“naturwüchsig,” and it is more directly related to nature in a scientific or
ecological sense. These vastly different connotations are made explicit when
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Marx and Engels write that “the natural conditions [Naturbedingungen] in which
man finds himself–geological, orohydrographical, climatic and so on.”98
Moreover, before they give their definition of gesellschaftlich, Marx and
Engels write: “The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life
in procreation, now appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural,
and on the other hand as a social relationship.”99 “Natural” here is “natürliches” in
the German and bears an intimate etymological relation to “naturwüchsig.”100 It
would appear then, that Marx and Engels are using these terms to differentiate
two levels of material reality: “natural” refers to a qualitatively distinct level of
reality other than the level referred to as “societal” (gesellschaftlich). The latter
may be understood as natural only secondarily–e.g., as an anthropological nature
that humanity develops from biological nature.101 The use of the word “natural” to
refer to the form of social power (soziale macht) determined by the division of
labor seems, however, to blur this line: it refers to the division of labor as a
(societal) limitation imposed upon social power. Social power, therefore, can be
seen as the conjunction of the productive forces of humanity and of nature that is
limited by specific societal formations such as the division of labor.
Social power is the intermediary between nature and society at the same time
as it is the intermediary between the base and the superstructure. The mode of
cooperation is a productive force of society, whereas social power is the multitude
98
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of productive forces accessible to humanity. Social power is the emergence of
productive forces from outside of society through the societal mode of
cooperation, which is itself a productive force. Social power determines the
character of society, but is also conditioned by the division of labor, which limits
the horizon of the emergence of social power. The regulation of the mode of
cooperation through the division of labor attempts to limit the influx or
multiplication of productive forces from outside of the society. As Halewood
argues, “[t]here is always a manner, a mode, in which cooperation occurs. It is not
that society is a fixed object; there is no such ‘thing’ as capitalism. It gains its
strength and its existence through the extent to which it informs ways of doing
things.”102 The mode of cooperation, then, is the point at which society opens onto
the social and it must be meticulously managed by capitalism if capitalism is to
continue to exist. When Halewood declares that there is no such “thing” as
capitalism, he is pointing out that there is never a closed capitalist system, but
rather only a regular pattern of capitalist accumulation and expansion of wealth
that requires the management of the mode of cooperation through the division of
labor. Social power is the source of power for every society, but it is not
generated within a societal structure; it is channeled through a specific societal
mode of cooperation from outside of that societal form: “Capitalist relations may
be the preponderant societal relations but there are always other ‘social’ relations
which both reinforce and inhibit such relations. The most important point is that
there is a tension between the two. Nothing is settled.”103
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III. Notes Towards a New Topography
From Halewood’s discursive analysis and my own rereading of The German
Ideology, I have derived a terminology of the social from the works of Marx and
Engels. I have also begun to develop a new topography of the social beyond the
base and superstructure. Yet, the rough sketch of a theory of the social that was
just outlined is neither Marx’s nor Engels’. By working with the specific
terminology deployed by these thinkers, I am simply looking to root a theory of
the social in a distinctly Marxist discourse. This will allow hopefully allow me to
work towards a new social theory that maintains the integrity and validity of
Marx’s theory of exploitation while also providing a new ontological foundation
for classes. In order to be clear, then, about the development of my discourse on
the social, let me briefly pause here to review some definitions.
First, “society” (gesellschaft) is an abstract, and general structure of productive
human relations. In other words, the character of a society is determined by the
mode of production. In capitalist society, there is a disjunction of public and
private through which the state controls or manages the relations of the public
sphere, while the division of labor manages the private sphere. Second, “societal”
(gesellschaftlich-) designates an abstract mode of cooperation of individuals.
Different modes of cooperation correspond to different societies: “it follows from
this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined
with a certain mode of cooperation, or soci[et]al stage, and this mode of
cooperation is itself a productive force.”104 Thus the mode of cooperation–the
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societal–is always subsumed under a definite form of society. That said, a given
form of society does not include or determine all of human reality.
Third, this analysis establishes that behind both the state apparatus (which
controls the public sphere of society) and the economic division of labor (which
manages the private sphere), there is social power (sozial Macht). Halewood
points toward this idea of social reality that is irreducible to the societal structures
which attempt to manage it when he draws a distinction “between the general
organization of a particular society (Gesellschaft) which makes up the totality of
the relations which consist at a given moment, and the social might of the
multiplied productive force. The social (sozial), as has been seen, invokes both
more and less than the societal relations of Gesellschaft.”105 Social power, as the
multiplied productive forces, is given societal expression through its conjunction
with the means of cooperation. Because social power is irreducible to a given
society, it poses a threat at the same time as it is the source of societal wealth. It
must, therefore, be managed by society through the state, through ideology, and
through the division of labor. Capital attempts to subsume the productive forces
of social power, but these productive forces can also be weaponized by the
masses: social power is both a potential source of wealth and a potential
revolutionary force.
Fourth and finally, I argue that if social power is derived from outside of a
given society or societal form, then this outside can be recognized as something
distinct, and this will here be given the term “sociality” (roughly analogous to
sozietät). Sociality should be thought of as a smooth space upon which societal
105
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territories are inscribed. These territories limit the potential influx of social power
through the state–a reification of legal and illegal political relations–and the
division of labor–a reification of legitimate and illegitimate property relations.
Borrowing terminology that will be vital to a later section of this chapter, I will
say that societal power is developed by transcendent apparatuses of control that
seek to manage social power, which is immanent in material reality conceived of
as sociality.106
As we discovered in the preceding chapter, in order to establish the capitalist
division of labor on the smooth space of sociality, economic relations must first
be fetishized. That is, social power must be channeled through an economic
division of labor predicated on a fetishized societal consciousness.107 One could
argue that ideology is the hegemonic link that makes capitalism into a coherent
form of society by bridging the apparatuses of control in the public and private
spheres. The most important conclusion to be drawn from this rough outline of a
social theory is a reformulation of the fact that classes are products of the division
of labor: they are territorialized identities that belong to a given society. The point
of the proletarian revolution, however, is to liberate productive forces from the
division of labor and, therefore, the proletariat cannot be a revolutionary class
without also dismantling its own class identity.
IV. State, Economy, and Sociality
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The four conclusions that can be drawn from the distinction between sociality
and society still do little to clarify how society functions or what it is. In order to
develop this line of thought, the division of bourgeois society into the state and
the division of labor as two means of maintaining a regular pattern of productivity
must be subjected to further investigation. In Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies on
Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, Étienne Balibar sheds some light
on the politico-economic functioning of society in a section titled “In Search of
the Proletariat: The Notion of Class Politics in Marx.” Late in this piece, Balibar
argues that
the labor relation (as a relation of exploitation) is immediately
economic and political; the form of the "economic community"
and that of the state "grow" simultaneously out of this "basis."
There can therefore be no ambiguity: if there are "mediations;'
neither do they take place between pre-existing economic and
political spheres, nor does one originate from a pre-existing other.
Rather, the formation and the evolution of each of them occurs
from their permanent common basis, which precisely explains the
"correlation" that remains between the two. In other words, the
relations of the exploitation of labor are both the "seed" of the
market ("economic community") and the seed of the state
(sovereignty/ servitude).108
Bourgeois ideology divides social reality into separates spheres of economics and
politics and, through Hegel, brings with this division the idea that the economic
evolves out of the state. Marx’s own analysis of society has been frequently read
as a reversal of the Hegelian logic regarding the determinant relation between the
state and civil society.109 In this traditional reading, Marx argues that the state
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evolves out of civil society. According to Balibar, however, the real Marxist
subversion of bourgeois ideology is in the rejection of the division between the
two spheres. This subversion is done by asserting that the public and private
spheres are both erected on a third principle–the labor relation–that is irreducible
to either sphere.
The labor-relation is always something more than societal; it is not limited to
the system of capitalism in an exclusively economic sense and it is for this very
reason that the labor-relation produces effects outside of the economic realm. The
labor relation that overspills the economic and the political, and which is also the
basis for these two spheres, is, moreover, a relation of exploitation. And here,
through Balibar, we return to our earlier discussion of the theory of exploitation:
“What Marx calls exploitation is a process with two sides, neither of which has a
privileged position over the other; they are designated by the two correlative
terms surplus labor and surplus value…”110 Surplus labor is the difference
between the socially necessary labor, symbolized by money, that the capitalist
used to purchase labor-power and the value actually produced by the labor that
was bought: it is the unpaid labor that generates value appropriated by the
capitalist. This appropriated value is surplus-value–“the ‘abstract’ movement of
the valorization of value, or the differential in the increase of capital.”111 The
extraction of surplus-labor and its valorization as surplus-value is what defines the
exploitative labor-relation of capitalism; it is
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a social relation in which labor-power is treated as a ‘commodity,’
and occurs only to the extent that it can be so treated (for it does
resist). In other words, [this] self-movement [of capitalism]
presupposes a series of unstable conditions, some created in the
sphere of production (labor discipline and habits, a hierarchy of
skills and salaries, etc.), and others created ‘outside’ of this sphere,
in the ‘social’ space supervised by the state.112
The phrase “self-movement of capitalism” is taken from Marx’s Capital and
refers to the pattern of regularity that defines the capitalist system. Combining this
notion of the self-movement of capitalism with Halewood’s assertion that
capitalism is not a “thing” in the sense of a static and self-contained unity, I can
say that the self-movement of capitalism is its exploitation of labor in order to
valorize surplus labor as surplus value. Labor carried out at the level of the mode
of cooperation–the point at which society opens up to its exteriority in sociality–
must be restricted and managed by a whole series of technologies that maintain
the exploitative relationship and repress other productive possibilities that would
rupture the societal territory. These restrictive technologies are conditions that
secure the reproduction of the societal regularity: that is to say that these
technologies, both economic and political, are ideological constraints placed upon
social power.
Balibar reveals another side of the labor relation when he asserts that laborpower resists being treated as a commodity. The mode of cooperation is the
societal organization of social activity, but there is activity that overspills the
mode of cooperation itself. The mode of cooperation is the initial societal territory
carved out of sociality, the ground of social reality: “the analysis of exploitation
implies that any soci[et]al relation must be the organization of a material
112
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constraint upon social groups defined as a function of the nature of this
constraint.”113 It is in this way that the division of labor produces classes through
a series of technologies of power that produce the bodies they seek to control. But
the entities produced by the techniques of power also resist these technologies.
The territorializing movement of society implies the deterritorializing force of
sociality; this fundamental antagonism determines the boundaries of the possible
as it is envisioned from within the scope of a society, and it is for this reason that
“proletarian demands are directly perceived, in the [societal] space of the
dominant ideology, as ‘nonpolitical,’ even if in order to obtain such a result a
whole arsenal of forms of state action must be deployed.”114 The state–a
transcendent apparatus of control over the sociality, which is territorialized as the
public realm–must enact a series of operations in order to maintain the distinction
between public and private. This is done in order to keep social power from
emerging as both a political and economic force that can be harnessed by the
exploited and dominated as a revolutionary force. But this abstract formulation is
as yet unclear.
In any case, the most important insight that Balibar has provided us is that
classes are produced by the division of labor and a host of other requisite
technologies of power that secure the pattern of regularity that defines the society.
But these classes do not themselves pose a threat to the societal structure; the very
social power that is managed and subsumed within capital is the real radical force
of change. That is to say, the “working-class” is itself the product of a societal
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territorialization (according to the division of labor and the mode of production).
And, now we must discover what the material components of classes are in order
to understand how societal change is even possible. What I am really asking is:
beyond the territorial production or “classification” of the “working-class,” what
is the vital force that makes societal change thinkable?
V. From Class to Mass to Multitude
Balibar argues that there is a dual sense to the being of the proletariat. It
appears to surface in Marx’s writing as either a class or a mass and sometimes as
both. Balibar Writes: “In The German Ideology,” for instance, “only the
bourgeoisie is a ‘class’; the proletariat, on the contrary, is defined as a ‘mass’, as
the last product of the decomposition of society. This definition precisely makes it
the agent for a communist revolution in which no ‘particular’ interest (no ‘class
interest’) need be advanced.”115 This interpretation of the proletariat further
complicates a Marxist understanding social reality. Society is made up of classes
and to some extent is determined by them in the sense that the division of labor
conditions the mode of cooperation through which social power is realized and
determines the conditions of society in general. But now there is, aside from
classes, the existence of a mass (if not a plurality of masses) that is supposed to
transcend or subvert class distinctions.
Balibar adds that the ontology of “mass,” much like the ontology of “class,”
has never been fully clarified within the Marxist tradition, but that the concept of
deployment of the term “mass”
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keeps oscillating between the description of a social condition, in
which the “communal bonds” of traditional societies are collapsing
and a radical isolation of individuals is emerging, and the
description of a movement, in which the diversity of conditions is
covered over by a common “consciousness” or ideology which
aims at the transformation of the existing order.116
In other words, the emergence of masses as political beings coincides with a
societal crisis in which the mode of cooperation specific to a given society seems
to be in the process of dissolving–i.e., there is an atomization of social entities as
traditional identities collapse–while at the same time there is a movement toward
a greater collective power outside of the societally restricted boundaries of the
possible. Putting this in the context of the critical moment of chapter 2, in which
we saw Marx giving up on defining the concept of class in the third volume of
Capital, I could say that the ideological links that bind classes together unravel to
reveal the social disunity upon which the societal order is founded. At the same
time as class identities unravel, however, the movement of social power develops
into a revolutionizing constitutive moment in which the entire societal order is
transformed.
The conceptual bridge that makes this dissolution of societally produced and
mediated subjectivities coincide with a constitution of a collective and
revolutionized social power is the concept of population. In Capital, Marx argues
that “a surplus population of workers is a necessary product of… [and] a
condition for the existence of the capitalist mode of production.”117 Later in this
same text, he argues that the development of the capitalist mode of production in
different spheres of economic activity produces specific population flows: as
116
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agriculture is incorporated into the capitalist mode of production and its
productivity is enhanced both by the use of machinery and through capitalist
techniques of management, for example, the requisite number of agricultural
workers falls and workers are forced to look to cities for employment.118 “Part of
the agricultural population is therefore constantly on the point of passing over into
an urban or manufacturing proletariat, and on the lookout for opportunities to
complete this transformation.”119 During the birth of capitalism, at a macro-level,
then, society attempts to control and establish regular patterns of population
development according to developments and sanctions of economic and legal
apparatuses. As Balibar argues, “[f]rom this point of view, the concept of
population in Marx is the mediation par excellence between the idea of ‘class’
and the idea of ‘mass.’ And I could go so far as to say that ‘population
movements’ are the main basis of explanation for ‘mass movements.’”120
To better frame this within the context of my analysis of Michael Halewood
and The German Ideology, let me say that population now appears as a double
relationship. On the one hand, it is societally regulated (by law and commerce)
and stratified (by the division of labor); on the other hand, it is the natural root of
social power.121 To say that population control is a precondition and a production
of capitalism’s pattern of regularity is then to say that capitalism is not only an
economically or politically exploitative societal form; it also requires a network of
118

The eradication of the English agricultural commons in the 18th century takes this principle of
population control one step further by integrating the law into the economy in order to push
workers to the city and develop a suitably productive proletarian population in industrial
manufacturing.
119
Marx, Capital, 796.
120
Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, 146.
121
For the multiple sub-classes within the proletariat that are developed by the capitalist law of
population, see Marx, Capital, 794-802.

92

biopolitical regulation, which is expanded and intensified with the development of
bourgeois society.122
I can now put forward the thesis that the regulation of the mode of cooperation
is precisely this biopolitical aspect of capitalist society, and this becomes clear
when I stress that the sociality of cooperation as it is defined in The German
Ideology applies not only to cooperative labor, but also to any cooperative
intercourse, and is specifically connected to procreation. The mode of cooperation
is active in determining society not only in terms of its economic or political
productivity, but also in terms of its regulation and production of life. Capital, and
its value-form, attempts to subsume all of life, not just economically productive
labor.
From what has just been said, I can assert that masses are vital entities that
exist on the plane of sociality and are regulated within societal territories. They
are territorialized as classes by societal apparatuses of control (economic,
political, and biopolitical). Classes, therefore, cannot be revolutionary, since the
specificity of their existence is a production of the techniques of power that seek
to dominate and exploit their underlying social power. The proletariat, for this
very reason, is not, strictly speaking, a “class.” Rather, the proletariat is the mass
that is partially territorialized, or incorporated into society, as the working-class.
Balibar is correct in asserting that the revolutionary proletariat is a mass. But, to
facilitate dialogue with other thinkers who address a very similar set of issues, I

122

The developments of workers housing and, later, company towns represent some of the most
crude forms of the expansion of biopolitical power in capitalism.

93

should say that the revolutionary potential of the proletariat is rooted in the
multitude.123
VI. A Brief Refrain
The Marxist terminology that was derived earlier provided me with an
excellent groundwork for constructing a new theory of social reality. Michael
Halewood’s work helped me to examine how some inchoate distinctions between
society and sociality already exist in Marx. By clarifying some definitions for the
four terms deployed by Marx and Engels with reference to social reality, I was
able to develop a new topography of the social in place of the base/ superstructure
model. The work of Étienne Balibar fleshed out this rudimentary theory with a
precise consideration of the ontology of classes beyond economic determinism. It
is imperative now, however, that I review the developments of this analysis in
order to ensure that I maintain conceptual clarity.
In the first section, I argued that “society” is a territorialization of “sociality”
that orders the chaos of the latter according to a pattern of regularity that defines
the former. Society is the hierarchized territory inscribed on sociality. Sociality is
a smooth space of being that is not, as yet ordered–it is immanent social reality.124
This departs from the relations of determination that define the
base/superstructure model in that in this new theory there is no hierarchical
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subordination of society to sociality; the social is a ground of emergence for
societies.
The pattern of regularity–or principle of “self-movement,” to use a more
Marxist phrase–of a society is determined by apparatuses and networks of control
that are political, economic, and biopolitical. This principle of self-movement of
“society” reveals that it is not a static thing, but an ordering dynamic that attempts
to limit the possible multiplication of social power beyond those that it can
control and convert, in capitalism, into wealth.
“Social power” is the life-force of a society and its potential source of
dissolution. “Social power” is the multiplication of productive forces of sociality
that is channeled through the mode of cooperation, which incorporates it into the
pattern of regularity of society. The mode of cooperation is a societally mediated
productive force; it is the point at which society must remain open to sociality.
(Were it to close itself off to its exterior, it would stagnate and cease to exist.)
In my analysis of Balibar, in section 4, I asserted that Classes are societal
entities produced by the division of labor and organized according to the mode of
cooperation. Their identities only make sense within a given societal form, and
they cease to exist when that societal form enters a revolutionary period of crisis.
For this reason, classes themselves are not revolutionary entities. They are the
products of societal territorialization of the multitude, which is an immanent
aspect of sociality. That is to say that the multitude is the external social force to
which society must remain open. Moreover, the multitude resists territorialization
and subsumption carried out by capital. It is in this resistance against
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classification that the multitude is capable of introducing revolutionized social
power into society.
Revolution, then, is an irruption of societally repressed or regulated forces of
sociality into society. As Balibar argues:
This thesis… admits that the emergence of a revolutionary form of
subjectivity (or identity) is always a partial effect and never a
specific property of nature, and therefore brings with it no
guarantees, but obliges us to search for the conditions in a
conjuncture that can precipitate class struggles into mass
movements...125
The outcome of the revolution is not determined by any laws or logic; it is the
contingent outcome of the struggle against classification and against the
techniques of power that drive it.
Because the irruption of revolutionized social power presupposes such
techniques of societal power it follows that the limit of the revolution is the
absolute destruction of society as a transhistorical concept and construct. Sociality
only finds its expression in society. It is either a source of power, incorporated
into the reproduction of a societal pattern of regularity, or it is a revolutionary
force that ruptures the pattern of regularity; in either case, there is no immanent
return to pure sociality. Every territorialization presupposes a deterritorializing
force of resistance, and the reverse is also true. This is why communist society is
imagined as a gesellschaft: we must return to an order of things. The goal of the
proletarian revolution, then, is to establish an order, a society, with borders that
are not impassible horizons, but zones of indetermination. A communist society
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would be one that sets borders into variation so that they may be reconstituted
according to the movement of sociality–the life of the multitude.
Finally, from all that has just been said, I conclude that capitalism is a form of
society defined by a pattern of regularity that attempts to code all of social life,
and not just productive labor-time restricted to the mode of production (or the
sphere of production within the mode of production). Not only is labor-power
subsumed by capital as a commodity, but all of social life is incorporated into the
production of capital. Guy Debord dubbed this subsumption of social reality into
capital the production of the “society of the spectacle,” which “corresponds to the
historical moment at which the commodity completes its colonization of social
life… [when] the world we see is the world of the commodity.”126

VII. Iteration–What is Capital (Crisis)?
Thus far in this chapter, much attention has been paid to the functioning of
society and its apparatuses of control, but little has been said about the particular
character of this relation of domination. As has already been stated,
territorialization implies deterritorialization in the same way that every relation of
domination also implies a force of resistance. Therefore, just as the success of the
revolution is never guaranteed, the subsumption of all of social life into capital is
never complete; a society must remain open to its social exterior. In this way,
social reality must overspill societal capture if there is to be a continued process
of subsumption. This excess of sociality is not a surplus in the sense of surplus-
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value or surplus-labor; it is in a very real way useless for the self-movement of
capital except in that it secures its condition of continuation.
This excess of social reality, however, is also the condition of revolution and
societal dissolution. In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri write that
“capitalist crisis is not simply a function of capital’s own dynamics but is caused
directly by proletarian conflict.”127 The class-struggle itself determines the laws of
capitalism’s self-movement and it is this other side of the production of a societal
pattern of regularity that is obscured by the same fetishism that alienates usevalue for exchange-value. 128 Fetishism is the original pattern of regularity that
secures the stability of the value-form of capital by hiding the contingent reality
upon which its reproduction is based from the proletariat, which is both the real
source of capital’s value and its object of exploitation.
This means that at the same time as the forces of societal reproduction
constrain the influx of social power, the influx of social power limits the process
of societal territorialization. “Proletarian struggles constitute–in real ontological
terms–the motor of capitalist development… The struggles force capital
continually to reform the relations of production and transform the relations of
domination.”129 The point here is that the form of capitalist society and, by
extension, the value-form of capital is not determined by the internal logic of a
society, but rather by the violent irruption of social power–particularly the power
127
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of the multitude that disrupts the mode of cooperation in its effort to resist being
subsumed by capital.
There is no better illustration of this point than the militant labor activism that
swept across the United States of America in the middle of the Great Depression.
Despite the fact that unemployment is, as we have seen, systemically built into
capitalism as a means of controlling workers by threatening them with job
insecurity (e.g., the possibility of being replaced at any minute by a more willing
worker), Depression-era workers across the country rose up and seized control of
the means of production in order to demand higher-wages and better working
conditions. The majority of these strikes resulted in at least partial victories for the
workers, and, perhaps most impressively, this phenomena of labor militancy
emerged without and fought against the representative leadership of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL), which consistently pressured workers to end the
strikes.130 The societal logic of capitalism would have thought such an event
impossible given that the industrial reserve army of the unemployed was
supposed to guarantee the impossibility or at least the failure of workers’
uprisings in such conditions of economic instability. Furthermore, these strikes
resulted in an intensification of the reduction in the rate of profit, in order to meet
workers’ demands, which flies in the face of the law of the expansion of capital
and should be particularly unthinkable in a time when profit rates had already
plummeted. Finally, these strikes were not directed or controlled by an
organization that was supposed to represent the interests of the working-class.
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Contrary to the example we just explored, the commonplace narrative
concerning the development of improved labor conditions is guided by a liberal
capitalist logic in which worker conditions improved in direct relation to the
expansion of societal wealth. In this way, the successes of the workers movements
have been ideologically transformed into successes of the liberal capitalist system,
insofar as representative bodies such as the AFL can be considered a part of this
societal form. This pervasive mode of thought is visible in “democratic-socialist”
presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’ rhetoric regarding raising the minimum
wage to $15/hr:
Despite huge advancements in technology and productivity,
millions of Americans are working longer hours for lower wages.
The real median income of male workers is $783 less than it was
42 years ago; while the real median income of female workers is
over $1,300 less than it was in 2007. That is unacceptable and that
has got to change.131
The basic justification for such a proposal is that stagnant workers’ wages have
not “kept pace” with increasing worker productivity and skyrocketing GDP. This
argument essentially boils down to an appeal to the bourgeois state to raise the
minimum wage in order ensure that workers have more spending power. This
argument fits squarely within the logic of capitalism. The strike wave of 1934,
however, proves that the developments of capitalism do not exclusively obey an
internal societal logic, but are pushed by the power of the proletariat. This “power
of the proletariat imposes limits on capital and not only determines the crisis, but
also dictates the terms and nature of the transformation. The proletariat actually
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invents the soci[et]al forms that capital will be forced to adopt in the future.”132
These Depression-era strikes, for instance, not only resulted in local workers’
victories at the sites of labor agitation, they also served as a reason for passing the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which guaranteed workers a right to
unionize.133
The societal forms that the proletariat forces capital to invent, however, are not
restricted to the immediate demands the proletariat puts forth in an antagonistic
encounter; capital also anticipates future demands of the multitude and attempts to
restrict them by controlling their conditions of emergence–i.e., their social
autonomy. In this sense, “[e]very innovation is a revolution which failed - but also
one which was attempted.”134 It is for this reason that social reality must be
subsumed by capital to such an extent that its rebellious potential is limited. This
is precisely the case today when the globalized mode of “production of capital
converges ever more with the production and reproduction of social life itself; it
thus becomes ever more difficult to maintain distinctions among productive,
reproductive, and unproductive labor.”135 Domestic labor, or “caring labor,” has
long posed a problem to these distinctions in a way that has pointed out a
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patriarchal tendency in the Marxist tradition that ensures the marginalization, or
even the dismissal, of the value of what has traditionally been termed “women’s
work,” regardless of how socially necessary such work is.136 To situate Hardt and
Negri’s point in a more modern context and illustrate how it is useful beyond
critiquing the patriarchal tendencies of Marxist theory, let us briefly examine the
production of capital from social media sites like Facebook. Certainly Facebook
employs workers to whom it pays a wage based on their labor time, but the real
source of wealth for Facebook is the multitude of individuals who reproduce their
lives in virtuality.137 The virtual (re)production of social life generates
information that Facebook then sells to advertising firms as a means to increasing
their financial efficacy by targeting individuals whose interests match products
those firms are advertising.138 Furthermore, not only is demographic information
sold to advertisers to facilitate targeted marketing, Facebook also produces
“scientific knowledge” by running sociological/psychological experiments on
users in order to better understand human social functioning in a way that can also
be translated into value.139 This information is valorized in a manner similar to
capital’s valorization of the wage-labor of the industrial worker; in each case,
wealth is produced socially and appropriated privately (but in the example of
Facebook, the producers of wealth receive absolutely none of the value of their
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life-activity). The reproduction of social life itself, then, cannot be termed
“unproductive labor” since it is a direct source of capital. This subsumption of
social life by capital not only demonstrates the changing landscape of powerrelations in capitalism, it also multiplies the points of resistance beyond what are
traditionally recognized as sites of production.
The arguments of Hardt and Negri flesh out the definition of social force and
societal subsumption or territorialization by directly linking it to the struggle of
the multitude that is exploited and dominated by capitalism. Their analyses reveal
that there is no simple determinate dialectical logic guiding the development of
society. Rather, societal innovations represent tactical shifts made by the
apparatuses of control in limiting the revolutionary potential of the multitude. In
Marx’s day, this was done through economic control of the productive capability
of the industrial proletariat. As capitalism developed, however, it subsumed more
and more of sociality. The significance of this extensive and intensive
development of societal control is that the space of societal exploitation and
domination and the scope of social reality are increasingly homologous. This is
not to say, however, that they are the same. At the same time as each social
relation is increasingly becoming a relation of exploitation and domination, it is
also a site of resistance–a point of potentially revolutionary cooperation. This
understanding of the exploitation of sociality defies traditional Marxist
understandings of the value form of capital which rely on the sharp distinction
between a determinate economic base and a larger societal superstructure. The
fact that these forms of exploitation are nonetheless real demands that Marxism
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adapt and incorporate other modes of analysis in order for it to be a
comprehensive critical theory opposed to all forms of unjust power relations. In
order to be able to adapt to the diffusion of capitalist exploitation into all of
sociality, Marxism must recognize that classes defined with reference to an
autonomous economic base do not exist and that the real revolutionary force is the
diversity of the multitude that escapes classification.
VIII. The New Proletariat
Because the revolutionary social force is not a class, but rather the social mass
that precedes classification, Marxism must attempt to expand the scope of its
political efforts beyond the narrow conception of the economic-struggle. It is no
longer even fair to say that the economic-struggle needs to be made into a
political struggle, since increasingly all of social reality is subsumed under
capital. Thus, I would argue that, rather than recognizing an economic class as the
political agent of revolution, Marxism must understand the real revolutionary
power not in the political representation of an economic agent, but in the power of
social constitution that transgresses and subverts dominant societal relations.
Because capital’s extensive and intensive subsumption of social reality extends
far beyond a definite sphere of economic activity, anticapitalist struggle cannot be
restricted to classes so long as they are conceived of as exclusively economic
entities. The productive power of the multitude must not be restricted by societal
territorializations that attempt to divide it and restrict it. This means that the
boundaries of the revolutionary mass can never be fixed in any final sense. The
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revolutionary mass cannot be directed from commanding heights; it must be
produced through constitutive social action.
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6. Conclusion
And Implications for Further Research
The preceding two chapters have made the case that there is no alreadyconstituted class identity located in an autonomous sphere of economic reality.
The theory of the social whole that is divided between a determinate economic
base and a societal superstructure is not consistent with Marx’s own economic
theory, which ascribes so much importance to fetishism in securing the conditions
of possibility for the functioning of the economic base. The last chapter attempted
to construct a different social theory from Marxism by analyzing a discursive
distinction present in the writings of Marx and Engels between society and
sociality. The discovery of sociality amounts to a discovery of an outside to the
“social whole” described by Althusser. It reveals that there is not a closed system
of capitalism; capitalism is rather a dynamic societal form securing its pattern of
regularity by subsuming social power that is constituted in a space outside of
societal control. This social force is both the source of wealth for society and a
source of revolutionary power for the social forces that resist subsumption. To
summarize this distinction between sociality and society, I would say that the
societal pattern of regularity is produced through the construction of transcendent
apparatuses of control; these apparatuses manage and exploit sociality,
territorializing social forces immanent in social reality by giving them a
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representative form in order to alienate their actual constitutive power that poses a
threat to the established societal order.
The development of a new social theory was made necessary by the fact that
the ontological rootedness of class had been destroyed in the dissolution of the
rigid division between an economic base and a societal superstructure that
functioned as the model for understanding social reality in traditional Marxism.
We saw, in chapter 3, how the various concepts of class that appear in Marx and
Engels were fixed to a plane of consistency that was the economic sphere. If class
relations can be understood and defined exclusively with recourse to the
economic mode of production, then we could understand the specific intentions
and goals of every class simply by studying the conditions of economic reality.
But when social forces that are irreducible to an economic base determine the
character of society, then the nature of class-identity becomes a much more
complex and troubling question. When the social reality is not hierarchized
between an economic base and societal superstructure, but instead all relations
exist in a more complex web in which apparatuses of control attempt to exploit
and dominate nearly every social relation, then the issue of class-identity is not
simply one of the development of class-consciousness at the political level of
reality; rather the question becomes one of class-constitution–the very being of a
class is secured through complex processes of association and production that are
not exclusively economic.
This is not to say that economic stratification does not exist or that classes are
false productions of 19th century economic theory. Clearly there are differentiated
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levels of wealth and productivity for given populations. Clearly there are
exploitative systemic trends that oppress the poor and benefit the rich. But, what I
would say with regard to economic stratification is that this phenomenon alone
does not produce revolutionary subjects; economic stratification is intertwined
with networks of exploitative and dominative societal power relations that are
irreducible to economic activity. For this reason, “classes” cannot be the exclusive
subjects of political struggle, at least not as they have been represented in Marxist
theory. This necessity to understand the proletariat beyond traditional
classification is compounded by the fact that “labor” no longer refers to the same
practices as it did in the 19th and early 20th century; when the space of capitalist
exploitation is increasingly homologous with sociality itself, it becomes difficult
to ascribe to the exploited masses one class identity. The extensive and intensive
subsumption of sociality by capitalism forces us to recognize that the value-form
of capital itself has changed; surplus labor can no longer be measured in labortime when exploitation is not limited to a specific site and schedule. But this does
not mean that labor has ceased to be the root of value. I agree with Negri when he
argues that
the immeasurability of the figures of value does not deny the fact
that labour is at the basis of any constitution of society. In fact, it is
not possible to imagine (let alone describe) production, wealth and
civilisation if they cannot be traced back to an accumulation of
labour. That this accumulation has no measure, nor (perhaps)
rationality, does not diminish the fact that its content, its
foundation, its functioning is labour.140
The omnipresence of labor’s valorization reveals that the distinction between
public and private is utterly false and allows the proletariat–that great mass that
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resists classification and exploitation–to struggle to secure economic rights of life,
such as a universal basic income. This demand is only one of a series of steps
toward a post-capitalist system that does not build itself off of false notions of
class-interest, but rather is developed from the material conditions of the present.
The argument of this thesis amounts to a rebellion against theories of
representative revolution–i.e., political practices and theories that presuppose that
the agential mass of the revolution can be entirely directed and plotted anterior to
the actual constitutive practice of the revolution. The vanguard party cannot hope
to lead a true proletarian revolution if it seeks to establish a new transcendent
societal order built on the presupposition of the legitimacy of its theory of class
rooted in economic relations. Political theories of this kind fail to recognize
classes as movements (conditioned by resistance and domination) that are always
in the process of becoming. They are not ultimately determined by economic
laws, but by living and breathing beings and the relations into which they enter.
The totality of these social relations, beyond those that are immediately tied up in
economics, must therefore be recognized as “productive.” This new theory of
mass movement over class-identity is then a radical expansion of the horizons of
materialism that follows the spirit of Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” in which he
wrote that “[t]he chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism… is that the
thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived of only in the form of the object or of
contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively.”141
In this case, my demand is that all of social movement be considered the material
basis for a revolutionary project, and not just those social movements that have
141
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been traditionally classified as “economic.” Given the distinction derived between
societal and natural, this would include the forces of nature that are subsumed by
capitalism and that we, ourselves, are.
Despite the fact that the new image of the “social whole” presented here is
preferable to the base/superstructure division insofar as the former is not logically
incompatible with Marx’s theory of exploitation, this new topography does
contain a number of other issues. For instance, it raises a question about the nature
of capital and the transcendent apparatuses that territorialize social life: if these
societal forces exert power on sociality, then where do these societal forces come
from? This is a reformulation of the question posed in chapter 4–namely, “what is
capital?” In order to be consistent with the idea that sociality is the ground of
emergence for society, I must assert that capital is a specific coordination of social
forces, and not an essentially anti-social force that is imposed on social reality
without first emerging from it. Capital is, then, a specific form of social reality; it
is a coordination of social activity built on the exploitation of other aspects of
social reality. The aspect of social reality that is primarily by capitalism is the
productive potential of the proletariat, conceived of as a multitude and made into
a class only at the moment of exploitation.
As we saw in chapter 5, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels envision
the character of social reality in communism as a society, and not as immediate
sociality, while they also assert that in this societal form, people will be free to
engage in a multiplicity of social activities.142 This continuity of the formation of
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gesellschaft, society, maintains the critically important position of sociality
outside of society–that is, sociality remains an exterior to which society must
always be open. This could imply that social power can only exist when it is
channeled through specific societal structures. The goal of revolution, therefore, is
not to stop producing normative societal relations, but instead to ensure that these
relations are as free from domination and exploitation as possible. Revolution is,
then, the irruption of transformative social movements that redefine the societal
pattern of regularity. This would mean that all bodies that regulate social reality
would need to be recognized as social products themselves. The immanent
sociality of every institution reveals that societal structures are temporary and
mutable patterns of a larger social movement. This means that the goal of
revolution is not destruction but redirection of the macro-social movement that is
the societal form.
The revolution of sociality against society is eternal and its subject is always
being reconstituted. This raises a second imposing question about the
social/societal distinction: what does this allow us to say about our revolutionary
subject? The proletariat, which is now conceived of as a multitude or a mass and
not as a class, becomes difficult to understand when its interests and revolutionary
program cannot be localized in one antagonistic source understood as the late
capitalist economy. But this is not a weakness when we realize that there is a
plurality of modes of production intersecting in global capitalism today:
There does not need to be an orderly historical progression of these
[economic] forms, but rather they must mix and coexist… Various
regions will evolve to have peasant elements mixed with partial
industrialization and partial informatization. The economic stages
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are thus all present at once, merged into a hybrid, composite
economy that varies not in kind but in degree across the globe.143
If we recognize the existence of global capitalism that incorporates various mixed
regional and local economic stages, then we must recognize exploited populations
in industries and regions that escape the economic theory Marx developed in
response to the functioning of capitalism in 19th century Western Europe. Being
exploited by global capitalism, these masses would have to be recognized as
proletarians and not simply be dismissed from that revolutionary movement on
the grounds that they cannot be conscious of capitalist exploitation and the power
of the exploited. Global capitalism is reproduced in fundamentally different forms
in different regions; the proletariat will necessarily be determined by and
determine these relations and must itself be unique to each historical reality.
There is, therefore, no logic or theory that can represent the multitude of the
proletariat, since its identity is not limited to class-interests produced in one
specific form of the capitalist mode of production. Instead, there are a series of
societal forces of control that attempt to territorialize the multitude in various
ways that will subdue or repress its revolutionary force: these are not restricted to
economic reality, but must necessarily be societal before being economic or
political. The societal itself must be an interiority of a territory carved from the
smooth space of sociality. This smooth space is the social reality that precedes the
process of territorialization, and the sub-processes of domination and exploitation,
from which the pattern of regularity for societies develop.144 Revolutionary forces
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that emerge from this smooth space, therefore, cannot be submitted to
representative dialectical logic.
It may be worth pondering whether this theory leaves room for the
development of a political logic capable of representing the functioning of
societal structures apart from the masses they manage and territorialize. That is,
when a structure, such as the state, successfully reproduces a societal order
according to capitalist logic, can a dialectical contradiction immanent in the
functioning of societal structures bring about a moment of crisis that makes the
revolutionary action of the proletariat possible? Let me return to the example of
the onset of the Great Depression. This crisis immediately followed a decade of
unprecedented opulence and societal stability.145 The Depression was not brought
on by a revolutionary mass movement, but by the incoherent logic of laissez faire
capitalism.146 This presents us with the idea that societal apparatuses develop
according to a dialectical logic when they have minimized the influence of social
forces, which operate according to fundamentally different principles. This
restriction of dialectical logic to the domain of societal apparatuses would,
however, only be useful for understanding how instability is a natural way in
which society must remain open to sociality. Social forces would be different in
kind from societal apparatuses; the latter may move dialectically, but the former is
not set on a determined path. It moves a milieu or an assemblage; it is developed
through unexpected conjunctions of forces that multiply the revolutionary and
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productive potential of masses in ways that dialectical logic, built around
negation, is incapable of representing.
Many Marxists may want to reject the impossibility of establishing a complete
and closed logical system through which we could understand the interests of the
proletariat. Those who resist this impossibility should remember that my proposal
is not a dismissal of revolution or of the proletariat as the agent of revolution.
Instead, I am arguing that the proletarian revolution simply cannot be directed by
a representative body. Such a vanguard party would attempt to educate the
proletariat through the party’s representative image. The result would be that “the
People always support the Party because any member of the People who opposes
Party rule automatically excludes himself from the People.”147 If the class is
understood as a unity capable of being represented in a party, then opponents of
that party would necessarily be opponents of the class. Thusly all Stalinist purges
and the entire gulag apparatus would be justified as defenses of the true interest of
the proletariat.
Understanding the class as a product of economic apparatuses of control that
are imposed on the multitude may make it harder to theoretically pinpoint and
direct class-interests, but it also allows us to save Marxism from the
authoritarianism of the vanguard party. This conception of the proletariat as
multitude thus allows us to revitalize the radical democratic impulse at the heart
of the Marxist project. This more fluid understanding of a revolutionary body and
a corresponding tactical logic of revolution, which is incapable of being
represented, multiplies the possible forms of resistance to societal power from
147
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which capital derives its specificity. It demands that the proletarian struggle be
carried out in all of social life. The resistance of the proletariat must be produced
locally at the same time as it is globally communicable through a play of
differences. To attempt to categorize the various forms of resistance that these
different social struggles would develop is far too large a task for this thesis. My
goal has been to return to Marx in order to rethink the nature and revolutionary
potential of classes in a way that would revitalize the democratic spirit of
Marxism.
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Reading List
•

The Brothers Karamazov–Fyodor Dostoevsky. I began reading the Brothers late
in the fall of my sophomore year and finally set the book down just before the
spring of my junior year. I was introduced to this text by my good friend Kjell
Nordstrom, who studied Ivan’s tale about the Grand Inquisitor with Nico Jenkins
in his “Existentialism and Literature” course. The few passages Kjell read to me
grabbed my attention immediately. I was captivated by the image of a silent
Christ being condemned to death by the church and of the idea of humanity’s
psycho-social need to find the divine (or at least an order to the universe) even if
that requires its invention. However, I did not begin to read the book when Kjell
brought it to my attention for two reasons: 1) It was big and scary and 2) I did not
want Kjell to see that I was doing something he recommended. Our friendship is
defined by a spirit of playful stubbornness that is analogous to the relationship I
have with my youngest brother. My love of this book is inextricably linked to my
fond friendship with Kjell.
Early in Dostoevsky’s novel, there is a chapter titled “A Lady of Little Faith”
that has remained with me as it serves as a warning to those too entrenched in
theory. After hearing the confession of faithlessness from Madame Khokhlakov,
the Elder Zosima recounts a similar confession given to him by a doctor. This
doctor presents the paradox of his love for humanity by stating that in his dreams
he often went “so far as to think passionately of serving mankind,” while in his
life he begins to detest people when he has to deal with them in the flesh. Zosima
characterizes these two loves of humanity as love in dreams and active love.
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According to Zosima, fetishizing love in dreams is a particularly thorny issue:
while admiring Madame Khokhlakov’s understanding of love, he states that she
has not properly started to solve the problem if the motivation for her confession
of not loving her neighbor was her desire to be praised by the Elder and not a
desire to actually love her neighbor. At this, she recognizes her vanity rather than
a desire to love flesh and blood human beings as her true motivation. Zosima then
states that the first thing she must do in order to grapple with the problem is to
examine her narratives and motives–to avoid and examine her lies in order to
reveal the truth that they mask. At the same time, he emphasizes her need to act as
she contemplates–to practice active love even before escaping her dreams of love.
The doctor in the story has an intimate yet abstract understanding of the
movements of flesh and blood as well as an intimate love of abstract humanity.
It’s the in-between that he detests–the material reality in-between the conceptual
micro and macro realities. We must remember that the roots of our abstractions
are founded in the material world. We must recognize antagonism in the relation
between our thoughts and our actions, but without being paralyzed by strong
feelings of guilt or shame. These reactions can entrench us in our dreams,
throwing us into an introspective spiral that attempts to conceptually understand
the discontinuity between thought and action without practically changing
ourselves. The antagonism needs to be looked at not as a break or a gap between
thought and action existing within us as individuals, but as an actually existing
social relation cloaked in negativity and individualism. The social lie, the fantasy,
manifests individually, but must be separated from the individual conscience and
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examined as a real product of social relations, and at the same time we must act
before we have a definitive answer to the question of the meaning of the social
fantasy. Motivations must be examined not as our own, but as products of an
ensemble of social relations. This is the only way to understand and deconstruct
the apparent contradiction in the maxim to avoid and examine our lies.

•

The German Ideology and “Theses on Feuerbach”–Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels. I was introduced to The German Ideology in my second semester at
UMaine via Michael Howard’s “Social and Political Philosophy” course. Most of
the course to that point had focused on the works of social contract theorists–
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. While I enjoyed the arguments of these thinkers, I
was unfulfilled by the way that they each built their theoretical systems on the
presupposition of some ahistorical state of nature in which individual humans
existed outside of political and social formations. My discomfort with the abstract
primordial foundations of liberal political thought primed me to fall in love with
Marx’s critical method, which so forcefully takes historical irresponsibility to task
in The German Ideology. With his own conception of materialist history, Marx
wants to examine our abstract lies against an objective empirical truth located in
the material relations of economic activity
Though it is primarily a work concerned with the legitimacy of historical
narratives, The German Ideology is also a fascinating doorway into potential
theories of language and consciousness. I have returned to this text nearly every
semester to dive into ideas like the labor as life-activity, language as a material

122

force (with powers beyond communication), the birth of consciousness, and the
base/superstructure dichotomy. These possible readings of The German Ideology
fascinate me because they save Marx from being an exclusively economic or
political thinker. The discussion of these themes within The German Ideology
reveals how one can move from history and politics to epistemology and
metaphysics, and vice versa. This writing of young Marx traverses traditional
disciplinary boundaries of theory, revealing the smooth space of thought and
rebelling against the disciplined division of mental labor.
These deeper readings of The German Ideology were opened to me by the
three pages of the Marx-Engels Reader that precede The German Ideology, which
are dedicated to the “Theses on Feuerbach.” Comprised of 11 relatively
discontinuous paragraphs, this work is a series of critical notes on German
materialism that asserts the need to include movement, including human agency
or freedom, within the scope of materialism. The Theses problematize the
relationship between thought and action, between life and consciousness, in ways
that laid the conceptual groundwork for the theory of history presented in The
German Ideology. In this sense, the two works allow the reader to glimpse the
movement of Marx’s thought. It would be wrong, however, see these theses
merely as a preface to The German Ideology; these brief notes open up a series of
ruptures that multiply possible approaches to understanding human existence.
I think it’s worth noting that both The German Ideology and the “Theses on
Feuerbach” were, ironically, nearly lost to history. Engels discovered the Theses
over 40 years after they were written while he was digging through some old
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notebooks that came into his possession after Marx died. He published them as an
appendix to an essay he wrote in 1888. The German Ideology wasn’t published
until 1932 by the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow. By that time, the movement
of material history had taken a toll on the original manuscript: water damage and
the gnawing criticism of mice rendered certain passages illegible. Perhaps this
history of isolation and deterioration opens up an ontological problem for a text
that proclaims that “language is practical consciousness that exists also for other
men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me as well.” Thankfully these
works were saved from nonexistence and have been the most formative of my
thought of all of the works I have encountered.

•

Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison–Michel Foucault. This work was
one of the forces that inspired a profound shift in my study of philosophy and
history. Before 2014, I was entrenched in the Marxist tradition. I accepted many
of the central concepts in Marxism–the theory of alienation, dialectical
materialism, the division of the economic base and the social superstructure, etc.–
as objective truths. When I encountered a theory that didn’t seem to line up well
with some Marxist concept I would criticize it as an expression of falseconsciousness. This approach was theoretically justified with recourse to Marx’s
theory of history, which focused its analysis on material relations of production as
changing, but nonetheless objective sources of truth. Foucault ruined the certainty
of this theory for me. I’ve heard the guiding methodological question for
Foucault’s work formulated as: “if truth has its history, then how can history have
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its truth?” History cannot have an objective truth outside of the context of the
economy of power in which it was produced. Once we recognize this, we can also
recognize histories not as a transcendent narrative about the value and trajectory
of human civilization, but as a tool we can use to deconstruct the effects of
problematic power relations.
I still see in Foucault’s project the continuation of a vital strategy guiding
Marx’s theory of materialist history. What Marx is primarily rebelling against in
the German Ideology is the notion that we are at the end of history, that the
present and its specific forms of social consciousness are eternal. Political
economy’s primary justification for capitalism is the argument that it is simply a
reflection of the essence of human nature. History is useful for Marx as a means
to demonstrating the fact that human nature has fundamentally changed as its
economic reality changed. Marx used history to deconstruct concepts of static
eternal human essence and linked the production of these concepts with an
economy of material relations.
What I see as the central theoretical departure of Foucault’s critical historical
method from that of Marx is that Foucault also wants to deconstruct our
motivations for writing histories. It is not enough to deconstruct conceptual static
unities: we must also explore the way in which our deconstructions or positive
historical narratives are themselves products of problematic power relations.
Discipline and Punish can only be a critique of power in general after being a
critique of humanist history. It is not enough to say that European societies
stopped torturing and began imprisoning individuals they called criminals out of
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respect for their humanity. The fact is that this love in dreams–the naïve optimism
of this narrative–does not match up with the history of penal action that has been
haunted by recidivism since its inception. In other words, Foucault’s historicophilosophy does not explain the historical antagonism between ideological dreams
and actions as a movement of false-consciousness (as Marx does with his
formulation of the problem of ideology), but instead examines what material
power-relations are at work in the antagonism beyond economic relations of
production. Foucault sparked a violent rupture in my thought, opening me up to a
micropolitical plane that is, in my view, consistent with but critical of Marx’s
location of the macropolitical Real in the economic sphere of social reality.

•

Destiny Disrupted–Tamim Ansary. My godfather came to visit my family’s home
in New Hampshire during the winter break of my final year at UMaine. He took
me and my brother to a bookstore for Christmas and it was there that Destiny
Disrupted caught my eye. As a history major studying in the U.S., I’ve found it
difficult, if not impossible, to find a work of history focused on a region or epoch
outside of the Western canon that is not filtered through a lens colored by
American Exceptionalism or Eurocentrism and, for this reason, the idea of “a
history of the world through Islamic eyes” that was written by a native Afghan
peaked my interest. The fact that my neocon godfather was footing the bill
concretized my decision to pick up this book, as I thought it would be amusing to
have him furrow his brow as he looked this gift over and set it on the clerk’s
counter, putting his funds toward what he called “a work of fake history.”
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Destiny Disrupted is not a detailed scholarly challenge to our Western worldhistorical narratives, but a welcoming and fascinating introduction to the
historical experience of another world. Ansary argues that this dismissal of Islam
in “world history” produced in the West is to some extent responsible for the
“clash of civilizations” we are experiencing today. Treating history as a
teleological account of the realization of Enlightenment values “renders us
vulnerable to the supposition that all people are moving in the same direction,
though some are not quite so far along.” In my reading of this text, it seemed that
Ansary was trying to exorcise the Hegelian spirit haunting Western approaches to
history by breaking from the premise that world history is an absolute unity. He
points out that the qualitatively different event marking the parabolic limit “year
0” in Islam is not the birth of Christ, the individual savior, but the migration of
Mohammed from Mecca to Medina “which gave birth to the Muslim
community”–an already collective identity. If Western “civilization” is the
embodiment of divine virtue (the imitation of Christ), Muslim “civilization” is the
growth and life of the actually existing community of believers. Ansary asserts
that, looking at history through these Islamic eyes,
[w]e would know that the community had stopped expanding, had
grown confused, had found itself permeated by a disruptive
crosscurrent, a competing historical direction. As heirs to the
Muslim tradition, we would be forced to look for the meaning of
history in defeat instead of triumph. We would feel conflicted
between two impulses: changing our notion of “civilized” to align
with the flow of history or fighting the flow of history to realign it
with our notion of “civilized.”
Yes, this passage reasserts the master-slave dialectic; but it does not reaffirm it.
Ansary is asserting that we need to write and read multiple world histories in
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order to break the cycle of bondage built on recognizing one’s self through the
violent encounter with the other.
To me, Ansary’s work uses history as a tool in the same sense as Marx and
Foucault used it. He accepts a basic formulation of the “Clash of Civilizations”
thesis in that he agrees that there are qualitatively different “civilizations.” But
these distinct “civilizations” are not given to us by nature. These different
normative understandings of “civilization” have been produced by specific and
heterogeneous histories. Implicit in Ansary’s writing is a demand that we limit the
scope of “world history” to the age of globalization (roughly after 1870) in order
to recognize and confront the various and distinct narratives being played out on
the new stage of globality.
If the truth of “civilization” has its history, then this history can be changed, or
at least recast, in the historical present. Ansary sets the identities of civilizations
into variation. He is addressing Western readers with an account of the experience
of Islamic history. In this space between civilizations, Destiny Disrupted’s project
does not delimit bound beings but rather recognizes borders to be broken in the
empathetic movement of becoming-other.

•

The Monitor–Titus Andronicus. This New Jersey based indie-punk group released
their second album in March 2010, during the spring of my junior year of high
school. The group’s catchy guitar riffs and shredding vocal chords have never
been far from my ears ever since. This album, which once fueled my adolescent
angst, became an object of contemplation for me since embarking on my
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undergraduate education. When I was a sophomore here at UMaine, I even went
so far as to write an extracurricular essay on the first track of the album, “A More
Perfect Union.”
Named after the USS Monitor, the first ironclad ship commissioned by the
Union Navy, this band’s second album departs from the airy rage of its
predecessor and roots itself in the history of the American Civil War. The first
track of the album begins with an excerpt from Lincoln’s Lyceum Address: “If
destruction be our lot, we ourselves must be its author and finisher. As a nation of
free men, we will live forever, or die by suicide.” This forms the opening
pronouncement of the album and the central problem explored by the next ten
tracks. This problem is then dragged into the present as the fuzzy humming of
electric guitars and the band’s reformulation of Bruce Springsteen’s iconic single
“Born to Run”–“tramps like us, baby we were born to die!”–immediately follows
the final words Lincoln’s address. In the conjunction of these lines, it is not hard
to hear the echo of Camus’ declaration in the first sentence of the Myth of
Sisyphus that “[t]here is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is
suicide.”
The final track, “The Battle of Hampton Roads” is somewhat of a conclusion
only in that it is the most personal meditation on the struggle against
meaninglessness. Its namesake is a climactic naval conflict between two ironclad
ships of the Civil War, the USS Monitor and the CSS Virginia. The two ships
engaged each other in a close-range exchange of cannon fire for four-hours, each
failing to inflict any terminal damage on the other. The battle ended in a stalemate
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that redefined naval combat around the globe. The album’s final track uses this
violent stalemate as a metaphor for the ongoing struggle for authenticity: “I think
the wrong people got a hold of your brain when it was nothing but a piece of
putty./So try as you may but you will always be a tourist, little buddy./And half
the time I open my mouth to speak/it's to repeat something that I've heard on
tv/and I've destroyed everything that would’ve make me more like Bruce
Springsteen.” To my ear, these frustrated eruptions coalesce into an inchoate
critique of the self-centeredness and the lack of consciousness that plague subjects
of (post-industrial) consumer capitalism. In the end, The Monitor’s critique is
aimed at the conditions of, what Camus called, “a whole generation intoxicated by
nihilism, and yet lost in loneliness, with weapons in our hands and a lump in our
throats.” This strange mix of philosophy, history, and indie-punk may very well
be partially responsible for the direction my intellectual development took.

•

The Shadow of What We Were–Luis Sepúlveda. Mid-way through the fall of
2014, I found myself wandering the ornate marble halls of Rome’s fascistinspired central train station with no one to talk to and nothing to read. I popped
into the third floor of the station’s bookstore, which I was delighted to find that it
had been devoted to English language publications. I almost decided then and
there that the Anglo culture’s hegemonic global presence isn’t such a bad thing
after all; but then I found The Shadow of What We Were, a short novel about
communists and anarchists, memory and exile, and laughter after atrocity that was
brought about through a CIA-sponsored coup.
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Set in present day Santiago, Chile, the story opens on an old anarchist who
declares: “I am the shadow of what we were, and while there is light we will
exist.” When Nolasco next appears in the story, he is accidentally killed by a
record player flung in a fit of rage from an apartment window while he was en
route to a meeting of old revolutionaries. The dark joke of a man who in this story
planned to die intentionally being killed by contingency is perhaps Sepúlveda’s
humorous argument for the importance of a Marxist understanding of material
reality beyond the solipsism of anarchistic revolutionary practice.
Through the rest of the novel, the four communists with whom Nolasco was to
meet contemplate how to accomplish a mission without the Shadow to cast them.
While the heroes reminisce about their youth, the narrator takes over to discuss
the stifling atmosphere of repression under the Pinochet regime:
Life became riddled with black holes. They were everywhere, you
went into a subway station and never came out, you got into a taxi
and never reached home, you talked of light and were swallowed
up by shadows.
Many friends and acquaintances denied knowing one another, in an
epidemic of amnesia that was essential for self-preservation…
Forgetting became a pressing need, everything that had been
pregnant with the future suddenly became poisoned with the past.
Most of the characters went into exile and carried Santiago with them in their
memories. By returning to find that that the ones they love no longer exist, that
the city of their memories no longer exists and perhaps never did, we discover
that they’ve all in some sense been “disappeared by” the Pinochet regime, along
with the truth.
The Marxists, guided by the specter of the Shadow haunting their memoires of
resistance, decide to dig up Nolasco’s treasure, which contains a small black
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book, “a book that contained some well-known names and some quite alarming
figures.” In the end the revolutionaries–Leninist, Maoist, and Anarchist–enter into
an alliance to reclaim the truth of the past in order to restore the hope of the
future.
The Shadow of What We Were presents such troubling subject matter in a light
that is equal parts tragicomic and optimistic. I experienced this text as a literally
breathtaking work of art that could suddenly pull fits of laughter from moments of
tight-throated sobbing. In this way Sepúlveda championed the spirit of his friends
laid out in his lyrical dedication: "To my comrades, male and female/who fell, and
picked themselves up,/licked their wounds, cultivated their laughter,/preserved
their gaiety, and carried on regardless." I cannot help hearing in these lines the
echo of Bobby Sands, the Irish Republican who died on hunger strike and foretold
that “the laughter of our children will be our revenge.”

•

Field Work–Seamus Heaney. Heaney was a Catholic from county Derry, in the
north of Ireland; my father fits this same description. The beginning of my leave
of absence from UMaine, a couple of months before I found this book, was spent
with my family in Derry. My father did not come along for that trip, which
allowed me the freedom to do some digging into the family history without him
pulling me off of the subject. Dad rarely talked to me and my brothers about his
experiences in Ireland after childhood. Those early years of his life were set in a
world colored by bitter sectarianism and restricted by the systemic oppression of
Irish Catholics. In 1969, when my father was 18, that history of structured
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inequality irrupted with the furious violence of masses against the loyalist state.
The Battle of the Bogside, a four day clash of petrol bombs and gunfire, kept
police and unionists out of “free Derry,” and brought the British Army in to the
north, marking the onset of “the Troubles.”
The event that every relative recounted from this period occurred on January
30th, 1972–Bloody Sunday. On that day, the whole Coyle family participated in a
civil rights march protesting the internment without trial of suspected IRA
members. Protestors, frustrated by British paratroopers who were erecting
barricades to block the march, began throwing stones. The soldiers responded
with gunfire and the crowd dispersed in a panic.
In the chaos that ensued, my uncle was beaten and detained by British soldiers
until after curfew; my aunt, a nurse, threw herself over wounded protestors as she
attempted to care for them; bullets collided with the low brick wall that sheltered
my father from the approaching British soldiers. On the other side of that barrier,
Alexander Nash was shot down as he ran to his teenage son, William, who lay
wounded in the street and then died of gunshot wounds in front of his father. After
the ten minute “incident,” thirteen other corpses were recovered from the
Bogside.
Following the massacre, the ranks of the IRA swelled as volunteers flocked to
Bogside “safe-houses” where they would learn to carry a gun, or to build a bomb
like the one that would kill a friend of Heaney’s in retaliation for the attack.
He was blown to bits
Out drinking in a curfew
Others obeyed, three nights
After they shot dead
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The thirteen men in Derry.
PARAS THIRTEEN, the walls said,
BOGSIDE NIL. That Wednesday
Everybody held
His breath and trembled.
Field Work was written when Heaney temporarily fled Belfast, during the four
years that he lived in county Wicklow, in the southeast of Ireland. It is a deeply
personal work, reflective of this history in the north through elegies dedicated to
dead friends and dead family. But my favorite poems in this volume concern the
material relationship between people and their environment, particularly the sea
and the bogs of rural Ireland. Remembering the industrial past of the coastal town
of Carrickfergus, Heaney writes:
When they said Carrickfergus I could hear
the frosty echo of saltminers’ picks.
I imagined it, chambered and glinting,
a township built of light…
People here used to believe
that drowned souls lived in the seals.
At spring tides they might change shape.
They loved music and swam in for a singer
who might stand at the edge of summer
in the mouth of a whitewashed turf-shed,
his shoulder to the jamb, his song
a rowboat far out in evening.
When I came here first you were always singing,
a hint of the clip of the pick
in your winnowing climb and attack.
Raise it again, man. We still believe what we hear.
One of my favorite stories that my dad used to tell when I was a child was the
myth of the Selkie–seals that could become humans. These tales are almost
always tragic romances; a Selkie and a human will fall in love only to be torn
apart by the Selkie’s longing for its eternal home, the sea.
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As miners, the people of Carrickfergus would dig into the earth for crystals to
be kept. Now that this relation between the people and the land has ended, they
are only left with the constant changes of the sea. The people of Heaney’s poem
have reversed the old Irish myth and become Selkies that long to return to land.
The singer who stands in the turf-shed, a building that would be stuffed with peatbricks, used to be the link between earth and ocean; his labor produced his song,
which would propel him out to sea to find love. Through these lines, which
describe how his friend’s singing captured the spirit of the town’s life-activity,
Heaney expresses the materiality of language: “A hint of the clip of the pick…”
There is no direct rhyme in this line. There is a repetitive striking of the tongue
that never quite produces the same sound, just as the saltminers’ picks never
struck the same stone. Maybe the recognition of this material power of language
could reawaken productive forces that once seemed to make life whole.
My father loves to speak with me about these material and cultural histories of
Ireland, but he doesn’t sing anymore. In his youth, he was “all-Ireland” for banjo
and mandolin and played and sang in a number of bands. But his psyche was
injured in the Troubles as he watched the land he knew violently disappear to the
point that he felt the need to flee across the Atlantic. Maybe the songs he knew
are oversaturated with sorrow, or maybe they simply feel as if they have no place
in this new world. Nearly landlocked in New Hampshire, he will sometimes speak
to me of his longing to return to his eternal home. I am indebted to Heaney for his
work, which expresses and develops my own understanding of my father’s life.
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•

20 Poems of Love and a Song of Despair–Pablo Neruda. I discovered this work of
poetry in a Spanish class I took during my junior year of high school (2010). I had
no profound appreciation for poetry before that moment. Since then, hardly a
week has gone by without some words from Neruda’s verses passing through my
mind. Over the years, I must have owned at least 15 copies of this book, though I
don’t think I lost a single one. I made a habit of distributing this text to dear
friends and loved ones in their times of sorrow and joy. In my own personal
experience, the poems from this selection have intensified my passion and desire
in love. (En ti los ríos cantan y mi alma en ellos huye/como tú lo desees y hacia
donde tú quieras./Márcame mi camino en tu arco de esperanza/y soltaré en
deliorio mi bandada de flechas.) They’ve also occasionally intensified my sorrow
at losing love, while also reminding me that the painful (re)discovery of romantic
solitude is a common human experience; solidarity is to be found in the aftermath
of having loved in action as well as in dreams. (Ya no la quiero, es cierto, pero
cuánto la quise./Mi voz buscaba el viento para tocar su oído./... Ya no la quiero,
es cierto, pero tal vez la quiero./Es tan corto el amor, y es tan largo el olvido.)
Beyond their romantic significance, this series of poems functions as a lasting
connection to my love for the Spanish language. I declared a Spanish major
during my sophomore year here but quickly became frustrated with the structure
of the department and left. To some extent, I still regret the decision to departure
from a language I spent 7 years studying. Works like this one remind me that
though to a great extent I closed my academic connection to Spanish, it remains
an interest of mine and a minor part of my identity. I read the poems in the

136

original Spanish and reference the English versions in order to understand what
limitations are imposed on poetic language in translation and to compare the
interpreter’s reading of the poem with my own.

•

Don Quixote–Miguel de Cervantes. I began reading Don Quixote immediately
after finishing The Brothers Karamazov and was shocked when I finished it in
two weeks. I actually had some trouble staying focused on my course load as I
became obsessed with this fictional history about a man who becomes a knight
errant after becoming obsessed with fictional histories about knight errants.
Quixano the Good studied tales of justice and virtue and reinvented himself as
Don Quixote in order to fight for his literary ideals. His quest for justice, however
does not take root in the social world of Early Modern Spain. Drawing on this
example, I began to worry about whether burying myself in books had given me
any real understanding of the world that could be substituted for experience.
Don Quixote was the work that finally threw me into a spiral of dissatisfaction
with my academic track. After reading this novel, I decided to leave for a
semester. I saw in Don Quixote a challenge to reinvent myself outside of the text,
to not let consciousness shape my life in a commanding way, but instead to
attempt to let life shape my consciousness. Reflecting on my travels now, I am
aware of how very solipsistic the whole ordeal was–my nose in books, my pen in
a journal, and my heart closed to travelers who could have been more than just
acquaintances. This failure seems to mirror a misreading of the subject in Don
Quixote: I saw Don Quixote as the sole subject of the story without paying much
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attention to Sancho Panza. Sancho was a problem to me; he is an unreflective
hedonist who seems to blindly believe in Quixote’s outdated ideological dream.
What I missed is the real development of the central characters in this novel
occurs in the development of their friendship as they challenge and accept one
another.

•

Autobiography of Red–Anne Carson. Kirsten Jacobson assigned this novel in
verse for her “Existentialism and Literature” course, where phrases of Carson’s
like “There is no person without a world” and “Up against another human being
one’s own procedures take on definition” paired nicely with Jean-Paul Sartre’s
Being and Nothingness and Nausea. This performative treatise on how poetic
language can reimagine and produce life quickly became my favorite text from
my first semester at UMaine.
Autobiography of Red is a modern retelling of an ancient retelling of the
mythical 10th labor of Herakles–his slaughter of a red monster named Geryon and
theft of his red cattle. The ancient retelling of the tale was done by Stesichoros,
the post-Homeric lyric poet. Fragments are all that remain of Stesichoros’ poem
Geryoneis, in which he imagined and invented the life of Geryon from childhood
to his death in a way that treats Geryon as a full being, deserving of our sympathy
for suffering brutality at the hands of a less than heroic Herakles. Carson includes
16 creatively translated fragments of the original Stesichoros poem as a preface to
her own reinvention of the tale:
XII. WINGS
Steps off a scraped March sky and sinks
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Up into the blind Atlantic morning One small
Red dog jumping across the beach miles below
Like a freed shadow
XIII. HERAKLES’ KILLING CLUB
Little red dog did not see it he felt it All
Events carry but one
XIV. HERAKLES’ ARROW
Arrow means kill It parted Geryon’s skull like a comb Made
The boy neck lean At odd slow angle sideways as when a
Poppy shames itself in a whip of nude breeze
XV. TOTAL THINGS KNOWN ABOUT GERYON
He loved lightning He lived on an island His mother was a
Nymph of a river that ran to the sea His father was a gold
Cutting tool Old scholia say that Stesichoros says that
Geryon had six hands and six feet and wings He was red and
His strange red cattle excited envy Herakles came and
Killed him for his cattle
The dog too
XVI. GERYON’S END
The red world And corresponding red breezes
Went on Geryon did not
Carson opens this text on the question “what difference did Stesichoros
make?,” which is really a larger question about what difference poetic language
can make. Her answer to this first question locates Stesichoros’ importance in his
inventive use of adjectives: “These small imported mechanisms are in charge of
attaching everything in the world to its place in particularity. They are the latches
of being… Stesichoros released being. All the substances of the world went
floating up. Suddenly there was nothing to interfere with horses being hollow
hooved… Or an insomniac outside the joy.” In the poetic language of the Greek
epic-oral tradition, adjectives are structurally fixed reminders that maintain the
stability of the word and the world. Homer’s Athena is always “grey-eyed Pallas

139

Athena” and his dawn’s fingers are always “rose-red.” Stesichoros, Carson
argues, saw beyond the world coded by the epic word to find other possible
substances, other possible worlds, and brought them into existence through new
codings.
Geryon’s life was one of these possible worlds and was rescued by Stesichoros
when he took an empathetic look at the underside of Greek “civilization’s”
conquest of monstrosity. By making Geryon into a being valid of poetic
consideration, Stesichoros expanded the horizons of meaning. After delivering
this message in the first 10 pages of her work, Carson sets out to do a very similar
action by bringing Geryon to life in modern America where readers see his
newly-envisioned life as a troubled and anxious person unfold from grade school
to adulthood in 47 poems.
In the seventh poem, Carson fleshes out the movement between Stesichoros’
15th and 16th fragments. She has Geryon write the “total facts known about
Geryon” himself as a part of an autobiography project in elementary school. It
ends on a note similar to Stesichoros’ fragment: “Geryon had a little red dog
Herakles killed that too.” During Parent-Teacher Day, Geryon’s mother asks if
Geryon ever writes anything with a happy ending. Hearing this, Geryon takes the
autobiography from his teacher’s hand and writes: “New Ending./All over the
world the beautiful red breezes went on blowing hand/in hand.” By including the
two fragments in one poem, and by crediting Geryon as their author, Carson
reinvents the passage between them. No longer are they pronouncements from an
authoritative voice giving an objective account of the truth of the world. Now the
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two are the emotionally charged self-judgements of a sad little boy who writes a
new ending, which ultimately does not change the preceding events in the story,
to comfort his mother. In this passage, Carson opens up a new understanding of
Stesichoros as an author by questioning his motivation for writing fragment 16.
She also makes the modern reader see and feel the long-suffering life of Geryon–a
red winged monster of a boy outside of the normative bounds of masculinity and
sexuality. The other 46 poems in Autobiography of Red similarly invent and
unearth new possibilities of life for the reader and for its subject matter. Carson’s
writing and thinking stayed with me as evidence of the validity of a discursive
reality that ought to be considered a part of material reality.

•

A Thousand Plateaus–Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. If Miguel de Cervantes
provided the affective inspiration for my break from UMaine, Deleuze and
Guattari made me realize its necessity conceptually. With A Thousand Plateaus,
these two thinkers set out to unearth and celebrate a different mode of thinking. In
the translator’s introduction to the work, Brian Massumi argues that this mode of
thinking is not directed toward the consolidation of ever more knowledge, but is
guided by a desire to open new possibilities of life. “The question is not: is it true?
But: does it work? What new thoughts does it make possible to think? What new
emotions does it make possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions
does it open in the body?” Massumi admits that this presentation of thought may
have no effect on many readers who are happy with the tradition of “arborescent”
philosophy–philosophy that first lists its premises and follows the argument
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linearly through to its conclusion. There is nothing inherently wrong with thought
that traces the movement from root to trunk to branches, but Deleuze and Guattari
want to demonstrate that this is not the only life of the concept. Their
demonstration deeply affected me and I found that every “free moment” I had was
spent contemplating their writing.
These thinkers draw on the structure of the rhizome to form a new image of
thought. Rhizomes are subterranean stem-structures of plants which sprout roots
laterally (perpendicular to the force of gravity). They are made of nodal points
connected by lines spanning “nondecomposable variable distances” (distances
that cannot be divided without the points and the whole changing in nature).
Rhizomes are never fully-closed interiorities, “any point of a rhizome can be
connected to anything other, and must be.” The rhizome develops and lives by
entering into assemblages with other unities that are multiple in themselves–
multiplicities. Building on this image of thought, Deleuze and Guattari seek a new
geography for thought in the smooth-space of the steppe rather than the striations
and static unities comprising the forest. They structure this text according to that
rhizome-structure for which they advocate: it is composed of 15 “plateaus” which
can be read in any order and that constantly make reference (draw lines of flight)
to each other. Their writing covers linguistics, zoology, history, military science,
political theory, quilting, psychoanalysis, geology, botany, music, painting,
literature, mathematics, architecture and a hoard of other subjects as they
deterritorialize the boundaries that separate them in an attempt to reconstitute the
smooth space of thought.
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After reading this book for a semester, I began to go stir-crazy. How much had
I allowed myself to grow and change in my time as an undergrad? Had I simply
been following a ready-made path of social mobility and expectation? In high
school, I was a mediocre student at best. What drove me to attend college? It was
the next logical step in the preservation of my life as a member of the “middle
class.” Why did I move to Maine? No one from my social milieu in New
Hampshire would be there. But a jump from central New Hampshire to central
Maine is hardly any change at all–from college town to college town surrounded
by different trees in the same forest. What had I planned for a future? 7 more
years of schooling. It seemed like I was standing on a ready-made academic
escalator and minimally working to define myself. In my waking dreams, I’d
often go so far as to think passionately about leaving for another life: rolling hills
of Irish grass and the hard dusty surface of the Spanish desert beckoned to me.
But after reading D+G I wanted to move further outside of my familiar territory
and travel new roads cherishing encounters with strangers for the brief but
significant events that they were.
Deleuze and Guattari challenged me to pursue nomadic thought by taking to
the road. I don’t know if I could call my trip a success. I don’t know that I took
the risks necessary to say that I strayed too far from that path. But I rested my
head and discovered that there was indeed an outside to the academy. I realized
that I wanted to write and read even in that outside. To some extent, the question
as to whether or not in my travels I met their challenge has been left aside as a
truth I’ll never grasp. What is important is that because of their challenge to
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rethink change and movement as concepts, I feel more complete as a being by
continually trying to be open to anything other–to rupture my self. As they state,
the goal of becoming-… is to “reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but
the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no
longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, inspired,
multiplied.”
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